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Abstract. We show that experience good sellers facing myopic buyers can solve the in-
herent moral hazard problem by communicating their observation of quality before trade,
provided that communication is part of their public track record. Such cheap-talk commu-
nication, if trusted, allows market prices to reflect the actual value created, thus providing
an immediate reward for the seller’s effort which complements the conventional, repu-
tational incentives. Pre-trade communication achieves maximal efficiency when truthful
and the full efficiency as the noise in the seller’s observation vanishes. We fully charac-
terize the conditions for communication to improve efficiency and the extent to which it
does so.(JEL Codes: C73, D83, L14)
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1 Introduction
Solving moral hazard amounts to finding a way to reward the agent for exerting the
socially efficient effort. In long-run market environments, forward-looking sellers may be
incentivized by backloaded compensation schemes that price their goods in line with the
quality they delivered in the past, exploiting ex-post monitoring of effort via delivered
quality (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983).1 However, such incentive schemes are
impaired and fall short of achieving efficiency when buyers are short-lived and seller’s effort
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1See MacLeod (2007) for a review of the related literature.
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is imperfectly monitored, no matter how patient the seller is.2 We redress this deficiency
by establishing that the market pricing mechanism can restore efficiency in such situations
if, in addition to the past quality supplied by a seller, her pre-trade communication on
current quality is also properly reflected in pricing and in the trust level bestowed on
the seller. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result showing that cheap-talk
communication can help solve moral hazard by rewarding hidden action without delay.
The importance of pre-trade communication in customer relationships is well docu-
mented in the marketing literature (Agnihotri et al., 2009; Palmatier et al., 2006). But,
such soft communication by sellers on their good (e.g., online sellers describing the condi-
tion of their items and salesmen providing guidance to potential buyers) has largely been
overlooked in the context of incentivizing sellers to exert the socially efficient effort.
The core insight of our paper stems from the simple observation that whatever sellers
may know about the quality, provided that it is truthfully communicated, can help the
market price their product closer to the actual quality. This would allow immediate com-
pensation for the seller’s effort in line with the social value created, which may complement
the conventional, reputational incentives for effort. As such, truthful communication of a
seller’s observation of quality creates an immediate “efficiency rent” for the seller, easing
the incentive constraint for her to exert the efficient effort.
However, truthful communication is at odds with the short-term incentive of claiming
a better quality to get a higher price, thus it must be induced via long-term incentives.
This is an extra condition, in addition to inducing efficient effort via reputational motives,
that further constrains the ways in which long-term incentives may be devised if truthful
communication were to be accommodated. Hence, it is unclear a priori whether seller’s
pre-trade communication may enhance efficiency and welfare.
We characterize precisely when and how much of such welfare improvement is possible.
Broadly speaking, pre-trade communication enhances efficiency and welfare so long as
the effort cost is neither too small nor too big, reaching full efficiency across the entire
range of effort cost as the seller’s observation of quality becomes fully accurate. Two
key observations buttress such positive effects of communication. First, for the seller to
preserve her efficiency rent, she must sustain buyers’ trust in her communication. Second,
truthful communication and efficient effort are strategic complements in the sense that the
former is valuable only if the latter is intended in the future. Consequently, trustworthy
behavior of the seller and the market’s trust reinforce each other to uphold efficiency.
These findings lend implications on how the current feedback systems widely used in
2Note that the Folk Theorem of Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) does not apply when buyers
do not engage in a long-run relationship with a particular seller (see Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine, 1990).
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online platforms could be improved by suitably incorporating seller’s pre-sale description
of items. Online marketplaces have become a ubiquitous trading channel in less than two
decades after Amazon and eBay opened in 1995, notwithstanding inherently weak trust
between online traders due to their anonymity. Key innovations to tackle this trust issue
have been reputation and feedback mechanisms that allow traders to leave evaluations on
their counterparts for prospective future traders (Dellarocas, 2003).3 Another prominent
feature of online platforms is that prospective buyers rely on the soft information provided
by the seller on attributes and quality of her products. Our findings underscore the impor-
tance of properly designing communication channels and rewarding faithful communication
through reputation systems.4
Specifically, we analyze the effect of pre-trade communication by a seller who repeatedly
produces an experience good of random binary quality subject to moral hazard, observes
a noisy signal on the produced quality and may communicate about it by cheap talk
before selling the good in a market of short-lived buyers. The seller’s track record of
past communication and delivered quality is assumed available for potential buyers, which
typically is the case (or feasible) in online markets.
We represent equilibrium value as a “self-generated” value in the sense developed by
Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) and Fudenberg and Levine (1994); then we maxi-
mize the self-generated value subject to suitable incentive compatibility conditions. We
characterize fully the solution of this problem which turns out to be a tractable linear
program.
As a result we can clarify how the maximum achievable efficiency level varies depending
on the severity of moral hazard, the cost of efficient effort, and how noisy the seller’s signal
is. Without communication, the maximum achievable efficiency falls short of the full
efficiency level uniformly by an amount proportional to the cost of efficient effort, regardless
of seller’s patience. By contrast, with communication full efficiency is achieved when the
noise on the seller’s signal gets small, provided that she is patient enough. Therefore,
pre-trade communication enhances welfare if the seller’s signal is precise enough. It is also
shown that the maximum efficiency with meaningful communication is achieved when the
seller communicates truthfully.
As the seller’s signal gets noisier, two countervailing forces contend: on the one hand,
lying is more attractive as it is more likely to go undetected; on the other hand, it is less
3Cabral and Hortasc¸u (2010) and Klein, Lambertz and Stahl (2016) find evidence in eBay data that
feedback systems alleviate moral hazard.
4As an illustration, we note that two of the four options under eBay’s rating system are related to
communication: ‘Item as described’ and ‘Communication’. Amazon has a codification of the state of used
goods (from ‘like new’ to ‘acceptable’) and a dedicated section for “Customer questions & answers.”
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attractive because the price differential reflecting the seller’s signal, which is the short-
term gain from lying, dwindles. The former effect dominates except for an intermediate
range of noise levels. Thus, as the seller’s signal deteriorates from being perfect, the
maximum efficiency achievable with truthful communication changes non-monotonically:
it declines initially since truthful communication becomes harder to induce, then improves
temporarily before declining again eventually.
Turning to the cost of exerting the efficient effort, almost full efficiency is achiev-
able without communication if the cost is very low, but not with truthful communication
unless the signal is perfect. This is because imperfect monitoring of communication neces-
sitates triggering punishment with a non-negligible probability to prevent lying, causing
a non-negligible departure from the full efficiency. Hence, given any positive noise level,
communication improves efficiency only if the effort cost is not too small, more precisely,
when it is in an interior interval bounded away from zero.
In situations of severe moral hazard,5 it can happen that this interval vanishes when
the noise level in the seller’s signal is in some intermediate range but reappears both when
it is lower and higher (but not too high) owing to the non-monotonic effect of noise on
efficiency mentioned above. Thus, an interesting, counter-intuitive implication ensues:
efficiency may be enhanced by lowering the precision of the seller’s observation of quality.
We also provide a tight upper bound of the noise level below which communication can
be beneficial, which is not very demanding generally.
We conduct our analysis presuming that the seller communicates about the observed
signal, but she could also try to communicate about the effort level exerted. However,
the latter communication fails to raise the maximum seller payoff because it is redundant
when the effort level is correctly anticipated. In contrast, communication on signal conveys
new, interim information (not embedded in the equilibrium strategy) that can be used to
compensate the hidden action on the spot and thereby, boost incentives. The underlying
idea could be more general: falsifiable communication of interim information correlated
with the chosen effort may enhance efficiency.
This observation points to a link with the standard insight from the relational contract
literature (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989; Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002; Levin,
2003), namely, that incentives could be provided for the seller by delaying reward until
after the quality is realized, through ex-post bonuses paid by a buyer voluntarily either
directly or via higher future prices. Such a scheme however is not viable with short-lived
buyers who would renege on any promised bonus. Our analysis suggests that pre-trade
5In the sense (to be made precise later) that the efficient effort is not easy to monitor via delivered
quality, hence difficult to induce.
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communication may allow substituting ex-post bonuses with instant bonuses based on the
information revealed by the seller.
Related literature
The current paper contributes to the literature on trust and reputation. There are
broadly two modelling approaches to seller reputation as a mechanism to incentivize their
productive action. The first approach, elaborated by Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro
(1983) among others, rests on the idea that sellers are motivated to build a good track
record in order to earn the trust of future buyers and thereby, a higher future income
stream. If the seller’s action is perfectly monitored ex-post via delivered quality, essentially
a Folk Theorem obtains and full efficiency is sustained in equilibrium. We build upon this
approach for the case that the seller’s action is imperfectly monitored, and characterize
the maximum efficiency achievable both with and without pre-trade communication.
The other one is the adverse selection-based approach pioneered by Kreps and Wilson
(1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). Adapted to our context, a patient seller obtains
a payoff arbitrarily close to the efficient level by appearing as a “committed” type who
is believed to always take the socially efficient action (cf. Fudenberg and Levine, 1992),
but in equilibrium she mixes between efficient and inefficient actions and her reputation
declines gradually. Positing instead an “inept” type from which a seller desires to be distin-
guished, Mailath and Samuelson (2001) show, inter alia, that full efficiency is sustainable
if a seller’s type is subject to change at any time so that the problem of dwindling repu-
tational motive at very high reputation levels is precluded. In contrast, we show that full
efficiency is achievable even without hidden seller types, by utilizing the seller’s pre-trade
announcement to align her income stream more closely with the value she creates.6
More broadly, we contribute to the literature on repeated games of imperfect monitor-
ing, shaped by such influential papers as Green and Porter (1984), Fudenberg, Levine and
Maskin (1994), and Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986, 1990). Compte (1998) and Kan-
dori and Matsushima (1998) provide folk theorems for games with communication under
private monitoring and long-lived players. We focus on an environment where the power
of the Folk Theorem is impaired due to myopia of short-run players, as in Fudenberg and
Levine (1994), and we show that efficiency can be improved via cheap-talk communication
on endogenous private information.
We build upon the insight from Sobel (1986) and Morris (2001) that truthful commu-
nication may be motivated by the desire to preserve future credibility of communication.
Recently, Best and Quigley (2017) study how the concern for future may enhance credi-
6Jullien and Park (2014) show that pre-trade communication permits prices to reflect quality better in
pure adverse-selection settings as well.
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bility of a sender who sequentially persuade short-lived receivers in the sense of Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011) but without commitment capability. Our mechanism differs criti-
cally because moral hazard is key to sustaining credibility. In our model communication
doesn’t steer the receiver into taking a better action for the sender—given the seller’s
effort choice, trade always occurs and the expected price is the same with and without
communication—yet helps the seller self-discipline in providing quality. As such, without
moral hazard at the production level, there is no room for communication. Thus, our
contribution lies in uncovering the dynamic complementarity between two forms of moral
hazard: the effort in delivering quality and the credibility in communication.
Moving to the related IO literature, Athey and Bagwell (2004) and Athey, Bagwell
and Sanchirico (2004) show that ex-ante communication under adverse selection improves
coordination in a collusive agreement. Awaya and Krishna (2016) show that ex-post com-
munication improves private monitoring and helps sustain higher collusive prices. Our
work differs in that we focus on interim communication under imperfect public monitoring
without adverse selection. Also related is Rhodes and Wilson (2016) on false advertising as
seller’s announcement can be interpreted as advertising. They assume exogenous penalties
for lying and exogenous quality, and focus on allocative inefficiency. Inderst and Ottaviani
(2009) analyze firm’s internal agency problem of incentivizing sellers to advise consumers
through adequate compensation, under exogenous penalties for misselling. In comparison,
we focus on improving productive efficiency via endogenous penalties for lying that arise
as a result of failing trust.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the baseline model and characterizes
the equilibrium without pre-trade communication. Section 3 contains the main analysis of
the equilibrium with pre-trade communication, followed by the characterization of when
such communication is welfare-enhancing in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and Appendix
contains deferred proofs.
2 Equilibrium without pre-trade communication
We start with an infinitely repeated version of a standard moral hazard model with two
effort levels and two outcomes. To disentangle the effect of pure information sharing from
the standard reputation effect, we abstract from adverse selection on the agent’s type.
2.1 Baseline model
In each period t ∈ N, a long-run seller privately exerts either high effort h at cost c > 0 or
low effort ` at zero cost, to produce one unit of good for sale. The quality of the produced
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item, denoted by qt, is a random variable, independent across periods, that assumes a
“good” value (i.e., qt = g) with a high probability h if high effort was exerted in that
period but with a lower probability ` otherwise where 0 < ` < h < 1, and assumes a “bad”
value (i.e., qt = b) with the complementary probability. We assume that qt is unverifiable,
albeit ex-post observable, so no warranty contract is feasible on the realized quality. Note
that h and ` are used to denote both the effort levels and the associated probabilities of
good quality being produced.
Multiple short-run, risk neutral buyers arrive afresh at the beginning of each period
and leave at the end of the period. Buyers have identical consumption values of the item,
which we normalize as 1 for a good quality item and 0 for a bad quality item, that is,
g = 1 and b = 0. Buyers do not observe the realized quality of the item prior to purchase.
We assume that exerting effort is socially efficient, that is,
c < h− `. (1)
As is standard in related literature (Tadelis, 1999, Mailath and Samuelson, 2002, Bar-
Isaac, 2003, and Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn, 2013), we assume that in each period, due to
competition between buyers, the item is sold to one of the buyers at a price pt that is equal
to its expected quality based on the information shared by the buyers. One interpretation
is that the good is sold through an auction (say, second-price auction), which is common
practice on trading platforms. In an online appendix, we discuss implications of alternative
selling mechanisms, in particular, those of posted prices.
At the end of each period, the purchaser observes the item’s true quality, qt, and
publicly reports it truthfully.7 Hence, a price and quality pair (pt, qt) ∈ [0, 1] × {g, b}
will be observed publicly after every period t ∈ N.8 To facilitate application of the self-
generation idea of Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986), we allow for public randomization
devices between periods; however, our results hold without such randomization devices as
shown in Appendix (end of the proof of Proposition 1).
Let Ht denote the (public) history at the beginning of period t ∈ N, with H1 = ∅
denoting the null history. Denote by H the set of histories. A strategy of the seller is a
mapping e : H → [0, 1] that specifies for each history a probability e(Ht) with which the
7This captures consumer feedback systems prevalent in online markets and is standard in related
studies, e.g., Tadelis (1999), Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and Bar-Isaac (2003).
8The seller is also informed of the effort she has exerted, but this private history has no effect on the
set of equilibrium payoffs. Indeed, after some public history, the seller’s effort differs depending on her
effort exerted in the past. Upon reaching this history, the seller’s past effort is payoff-irrelevant for the
continuation game. For the agent to be willing to exert h after some private history of effort and ` after
another private history, she has to be indifferent between the two after the given public history. Thus, it
constitutes an equilibrium that she exerts high effort with the average equilibrium probability regardless
of private history for this public history.
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seller exerts high effort in the period following that history.
Given a seller’s strategy e, let p(Ht |e) = e(Ht)(h− `) + ` denote the expected quality
of the item produced after each history Ht. Then, the seller’s normalized expected payoff
from an arbitrary strategy e˜ when consumers expect strategy e from the seller is
v(e˜|e) = (1− δ) · E
[ ∞∑
t=1
δt−1
(
p(Ht|e)− e˜(Ht)c
) ∣∣∣ e˜].
A strategy e is a perfect public equilibrium (equilibrium, for short) of the baseline model
described above if
v(e |e) ≥ v(e˜ |e) for every strategy e˜ of the seller. (2)
2.2 Characterization of equilibrium payoffs
For an arbitrary equilibrium, the seller’s payoff/value9 is
v = (1− δ)(p1 − e1c) + δ
[
Prob(q = g|e1) · vg + Prob(q = b|e1) · vb
]
(3)
where e1 is the equilibrium probability with which the seller exerts h in the first period,
p1 = e1(h − `) + ` is the equilibrium price in the first period, and vq is the continuation
value after the realized first period quality is q ∈ {g, b}. As all equilibrium prices are no
lower than `, every equilibrium value satisfies
v ≥ v := `.
In fact, ` is the minimum equilibrium value obtained in the “trivial equilibrium” in which
the seller exerts ` in every period regardless of history.
Suppose there is a maximum equilibrium value of the seller, denoted by v∗. Then, the
continuation values vq in (3) may be replicated by a public randomization across extreme
continuation equilibria (cf. Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti, 1990, and Fudenberg and Levine,
1994): if the realized quality is q ∈ {g, b} in the first period, the “maximum equilibrium”
with the value v∗ ensues as the continuation equilibrium with probability ρq while the
trivial equilibrium with value v is triggered with probability 1−ρq, where ρg and ρb satisfy
vg = ρgv
∗ + (1− ρg)v and vb = ρbv∗ + (1− ρb)v . (4)
With this representation, v∗ is the maximum self-generated value in the following sense:
a value v is self-generated by a tuple (e1, ρg, ρb) ∈ [0, 1]3 if, assuming that the first period
price is p1 = e1(h − `) + ` and the continuation values are given by (4) with v∗ replaced
9As consumers have zero surplus, the value of the game and the seller’s payoff coincide.
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by v, e1 is optimal for the seller in the first period and v is her value. Any self-generated
value is clearly an equilibrium value (with public randomization).
Every self-generated value v is at most its first period payoff by (3), because the
continuation value is no higher than v itself. Indeed, v = ` is a value self-generated
by a tuple with e1 = 0 so that the period payoff is always `. Moreover, any v > v self-
generated by a tuple, say (e1, ρg, ρb), must satisfy e1 > 0 which implies that the seller
obtains the value v by exerting h in the first period, that is,
v = (1− δ)(p1 − c) + δ
[
h(ρgv + (1− ρg)v) + (1− h)(ρbv + (1− ρb)v)
]
.
By rearranging, we express the self-generated value v > v as a function of p1, ρg and ρb as
v(p1, ρg, ρb) :=
(1− δ)(p1 − `− c)
1− δ(hρg + (1− h)ρb)
+ v. (5)
For any (p1, ρg, ρb) ∈ (`, h]×[0, 1]2, the value v(p1, ρg, ρb) is self-generated if it is optimal
for the seller to exert high effort (as well as low effort if p1 < h) in the first period:
δ(h− `)(ρg − ρb)
(
v(p1, ρg, ρb)− v
) ≥ (1− δ)c with equality if p1 < h, (ICh)
that is, the future gain from exerting h rather than ` exceeds the current cost c (and is
equal to c if the seller mixes h and `). Conversely, any v > v is a self-generated value if
v = v(p1, ρg, ρb) for some (p1, ρg, ρb) ∈ (`, h]× [0, 1]2 and satisfies (ICh).
Consequently, a maximum self-generated value v∗ exceeds v if and only if the following
linear program has a solution, in which case v∗ is its value:
max
(p1,ρg ,ρb)∈(`,h]×[0,1]2
v(p1, ρg, ρb) subject to (ICh). (P*)
As v(p1, ρg, ρb) increases in all its arguments while the LHS (left-hand side) of the inequality
(ICh) decreases in ρb, the solution (if it exists) is p1 = h (hence the seller exerts high effort
for sure), ρg = 1, and the largest ρb subject to (ICh). This solution and the optimized
value, v∗, are calculated as:
v∗ = h− c(1− `)
h− ` < h− c, ρ
∗
g = 1 and ρ
∗
b =
δ(h− `)2 − c(1− δ`)
δ(h− `)2 − cδ(1− `) . (6)
It is straightforward to check that 0 ≤ ρ∗b ≤ 1 if and only if
c < c∗ :=
(h− `)2
1− ` and δ ≥ δ
∗(c) :=
c
(h− `)2 + c`, (7)
If (7) holds, therefore, the solution value to (P*) is indeed the maximum self-generated
value v∗ > v. If (7) fails, then the incentive compatibility (ICh) cannot hold for a legitimate
tuple (p1, ρg, ρb) with p1 > `, hence v
∗ = v. We summarize these findings in the next
proposition where we also establish that equilibrium values constitute a convex set.
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Proposition 1 In the baseline model, the set of seller’s equilibrium values is the interval
[v, v∗] if c < c∗ and δ ∈ [δ∗(c), 1), and is a singleton {v∗} = {v} otherwise.
Proof. In Appendix.
Proposition 1 establishes that the seller can be disciplined by appropriate rewards for
good performances with higher continuation values, so long as she is patient enough and
effort is not too costly. However, note from (6) that the maximum value v∗ falls short of
the socially efficient level, h − c, uniformly by c(1−h)
h−` . Hence, efficiency can be improved
only to a limited extent. The inevitable level of inefficiency, c(1−h)
h−` , is higher for a higher c
and also for a higher ` or a lower h. This ensues because, as the two effort levels get closer
in terms of the quality distributions implied, the moral hazard problem intensifies in the
sense that the effort choice becomes harder to monitor ex-post by the delivered quality.
3 When pre-trade communication is possible
We now modify the baseline model by assuming that in each period t, the seller observes
an imperfect signal st ∈ {g,b} regarding the realized quality of that period (g for good
and b for bad), which is incorrect with probability λ < 1/2.10 After observing st, the
seller publicly announces a message mt from a finite set M of cheap-talk messages. Then,
the item is sold to one of the buyers at a price, pt, that is equal to its expected quality
based on the information shared by the buyers, including mt. As before, the purchaser
observes the item’s true quality, qt, and publicly reports it truthfully. The game modified
with communication as such is referred to as the “communication model.”
Clearly, the maximum value v∗ obtained in the previous section can be replicated in the
communication model when the seller’s messages are ignored as they carry no meaning (i.e.,
via the so-called “babbling” announcement). We delineate the extent to which meaningful
communication can be sustained and improve social welfare by enhancing the market’s
ability to reward effort.
In the communication model, a history Ht is defined as before except that it now
includes the record of all past messages along with prices and qualities. A strategy of the
seller is a pair (e, a) of mappings where the effort strategy e maps histories to probabilities
of exerting high effort as before and the announcement strategy, a : H×{h, `}×{g,b} →
∆(M), specifies a distribution over messages conditional on the effort exerted and the
signal observed, as well as history. The expected payoff of the seller is defined analogously
10That is, st = g (resp. b) with probability 1− λ conditional on the realized quality qt = g (resp. b).
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to the baseline model of no communication, accounting for the information transmitted
by messages. We analyze perfect public equilibria.
Given that the seller’s message will affect the future course of play in conjunction with
the quality to be delivered, the optimal message to send depends on her posterior belief
that the realized quality is good at that point (i.e., conditional on the signal observed and
the effort exerted). We let pis denote this probability conditional on observing a signal
s ∈ {g,b} after exerting h:
pig =
h(1− λ)
h(1− λ) + (1− h)λ and pib =
hλ
hλ+ (1− h)(1− λ) < pig.
Similarly, let pi′s denote that after exerting `:
pi′g =
`(1− λ)
`(1− λ) + (1− `)λ < pig and pi
′
b =
`λ
`λ+ (1− `)(1− λ) < pib.
It will become clear shortly that the analysis depends on whether the seller’s signal is
precise enough so that a good signal (s = g) indicates a higher average quality than a bad
signal (s = b) irrespective of the effort exerted, which is the case if and only if
pib < pi
′
g ⇐⇒ λ < λ˜ :=
√
(1− h)`√
(1− h)`+√h(1− `) . (8)
3.1 Faithfully self-generated values (FSGV)
Clearly, v= ` is the minimum equilibrium value in the modified game as well. We are in-
terested in characterizing the maximum equilibrium value obtainable by a patient seller
when communication is available, denoted by v.
For any equilibrium with the maximum value v, the continuation value after message
m ∈M and realized quality q ∈ {g, b} of period 1, denoted by vmq, can be replicated by a
public randomization probability xmq ∈ [0, 1] such that11
vmq = xmqv + (1− xmq)v. (9)
Thus, v is “self-generated” in the sense described earlier: a seller’s value v is self-generated
by a period strategy (e1, a1) and randomization probabilities (xmq)m∈M,q∈{g,b} if, assuming
that the first period price is p1(m) = E(q1|e1, a1,m) and the continuation values are given
by (9) with v replacing v, the strategy (e1, a1) is optimal for the seller in the first period
and v is her value. By definition, any equilibrium value is self-generated if the continuation
11This has the flavor of tailoring the punishment to the crime (Mailath, Nocke and White, 2017) as the
continuation payoff for low quality is affected by messages.
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values are no higher than itself.
As noted already, every v ∈ [v, v∗] continues to be a self-generated value with a trivial,
babbling announcement (so that the price does not depend on the message). Characteriz-
ing v, therefore, boils down to finding the maximum self-generated value obtainable with
a non-babbling announcement strategy and comparing with v∗.
A key step in this analysis is to observe that if communication is necessary to obtain any
value, then a weakly higher value can be self-generated by a specific period strategy, called
the “faithful” strategy, described as follows: the seller exerts high effort (i.e., e1 = 1) and
reports the observed signal truthfully, that is, report m = G upon observing a good signal
s = g and m = B upon observing a bad signal s = b.12 We refer to a value self-generated
by the faithful strategy (and some randomization probabilities) as a faithfully self-generated
value (FSGV). To facilitate exposition, we state this result now and prove it later (in the
proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix) because the proof utilizes characterizations of FSGV
derived in due course.
Property 1. If δ is large enough, then for every self-generated value v > v∗, there is a
FSGV vF ≥ v.
In light of this property, we characterize v¯ by scrutinizing the maximum FSGV below.
For any FSGV vF , so long as the seller follows the faithful strategy, the two messages
G and B induce prices equal to the expected qualities given the respective signals, that is,
pG = pig > h and pB = pib < h. (10)
Let us denote by a vector x = (xBg, xGg, xBb, xGb) ∈ [0, 1]4 the probabilities that the seller
continues with the faithful strategy (i.e., the trivial equilibrium is not triggered) after
sending a message m ∈ {B,G} and delivering quality q ∈ {g, b}. Then, the probability
that her continuation value will be vF itself after delivering quality q ∈ {g, b}, denoted by
ρq as before, is
ρg := (1− λ)xGg + λxBg and ρb := (1− λ)xBb + λxGb. (11)
Thus, vF satisfies the recursive equation:
vF = (1− δ)
[
pB + (h(1− λ) + (1− h)λ)(pG− pB)− c
]
+ δ
[
(hρg + (1− h)ρb)(vF − v) + v
]
.
Given that the expected price in the first period is h (the expected quality from high
effort), this equation is rearranged to express vF in terms of x, in particular ρg and ρb, as
vF (x) :=
(1− δ)(h− `− c)
1− δ(hρg + (1− h)ρb)
+ v. (12)
12Truthful reporting means that the sets of messages sent after signals g and b in equilibrium are
disjoint. Hence, we may restrict the message space to {G,B} without loss of generality.
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This is the same form as the objective function in the program (P*) without communi-
cation when p1 = h. Hence, communication raises the maximum self-generated value only
if it can motivate the seller to exert high effort with a lower probability of triggering the
trivial equilibrium.
We spell out the incentive compatibility conditions for vF (x) to be supported as an
FSGV in the next section; then characterize the maximum FSGV in the subsequent section.
3.2 Incentive compatibility conditions
For vF (x) to be supported as a FSGV, the seller must find both exerting h and truthful
reporting of the signal optimal until the trivial equilibrium is triggered according to x.
For an easy comparison of the optimality conditions with the case of no communication,
we first write out the condition that the seller finds it unprofitable to deviate by exerting
` but following a truthful announcement strategy:
δ(h− `)(ρg − ρb)(vF (x)− v) ≥ (1− δ)
[
c− (h− `)(1− 2λ)(pG − pB)
]
(IChGB)
where the LHS is the expected long-term benefit and the RHS is the net short-run cost of
exerting h rather than `. Note that exerting h entails two effects: first, a good quality is
more likely, enhancing the continuation values (the LHS); second, a good signal is more
likely, boosting the current price (the second term of the RHS).
Condition (IChGB) is the counterpart of the optimality condition (ICh) for exerting h
with no communication. Comparing the RHS of the two conditions reveals that commu-
nication reduces the net short-run cost of exerting h by (h− `)(1− 2λ)(pG − pB). This is
the expected gain in current price from exerting h (as opposed to `), which arises because
the price, now reflecting the interim information on quality communicated by the seller, is
more aligned with the actual value created. This gain increases as the seller’s information
becomes more precise, asymptotically reaching the full contribution of high effort, h − `.
As such, pre-trade communication creates a differential in the expected current revenue
between exerting high and low effort. Such short-term incentives complement the conven-
tional long-term incentives provided via continuation value differentials and thereby, relax
the constraint for inducing high effort from (ICh) to (IChGB).
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However, such a gain from communication comes at a cost in the form of extra con-
straints. First, truthful announcement must be induced after exerting high effort. Second,
13For such easing of constraint, it is essential that the seller’s interim information on quality is from
over and above her knowledge of the exerted effort. While the seller possesses information about the
effort she exerted, communication of this information is redundant at any FSGV, because the effort level
is correctly anticipated and fully reflected in the equilibrium price. In contrast, communication on signal
conveys new information, lending additional scope for the market to provide incentives.
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communication opens up multiple ways for the seller to deviate.
We start with the condition for truthful announcement: a seller who follows the faithful
strategy and has exerted effort h (an h-seller, for short) must prefer to send the message
B (resp. G) upon observing a bad signal (resp. a good signal). This truth-telling condition
for an h-seller after s = b is
(1− δ)pB + δ
(
[pibxBg + (1− pib)xBb](vF (x)− v) + v
)
≥ (1− δ)pG + δ
(
[pibxGg + (1− pib)xGb](vF (x)− v) + v
)
,
which can be rewritten as
δ (pib∆g + (1− pib)∆b) (vF (x)− v) ≥ (1− δ)(pG − pB) (ICB)
where ∆q := xBq − xGq for q ∈ {b, g}.
An interpretation is that announcing G rather than B allows the seller to sell for
a higher price but increases the likelihood of triggering the trivial equilibrium by ∆q
depending on the actual quality. When the signal is bad, this risk must be large enough
for an h-seller not to mislead the market for a higher price, which is captured by (ICB).
When the signal is good (i.e., s = g), this risk must be small enough for an h-seller to
opt to announce G and get the high price pG, which is the case if
(1− δ)(pG − pB) ≥ δ (pig∆g + (1− pig)∆b) (vF (x)− v). (ICG)
Intuitively, announcing G should pose a greater risk of triggering the trivial equilibrium
when the quality turns out to be bad than when it turns out to be good. Indeed, the two
conditions (ICB) and (ICG) imply that
∆b ≥ ∆g. (D)
Now, we return to the optimality condition for exerting h. Note that the optimal an-
nouncement of a seller who has deviated by exerting ` (an `-seller, for short) is determined
by comparing continuation values from announcing G and B, conditional on the signal.
These are given by the same formulae as (ICB) and (ICG) but with pis replaced by pi
′
s.
Thus, (ICB) and (D) imply that an `-seller should truthfully announce B after s = b
because pi′b < pib; but she may or may not announce s = g truthfully depending on how
large pi′g is. Hence the condition for h to be the optimal effort requires, in addition to the
earlier condition (IChGB) that an `-seller would not be better-off by announcing truthfully,
that she would not better-off by announcing B after both signals, either. That is,
(1− δ(`xBg + (1− `)xBb))(vF (x)− v) ≥ (1− δ)(pB − `) (IChBB)
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where the LHS is the loss of continuation value and the RHS is the current period payoff
gain if the seller deviated by exerting ` and announcing B after both signals.
To recap, the value vF (x) defined in (12) is a FSGV if and only if the four incentive
compatibility conditions hold, namely, (ICB), (ICG), (IChGB) and (IChBB). In this case,
we say that the FSGV is “supported by” the configuration x.
Typically, not all four constraints bind at the maximum FSGV. Intuition suggests that
it is more costly to induce truthful announcement of a bad signal than that of a good signal
because the former requires compensating the seller for a low current price. In addition,
truth-telling is more likely to be optimal after exerting ` as the signal becomes more precise
because then the signal is the predominant source of information for the future. The next
lemma, formalizing these intuitions, is useful in characterizing the maximum FSGV as it
narrows down the set of randomization probabilities that may support it.
Lemma 1 If a maximum FSGV exists14, denoted by vF , then it is the solution value to
the relaxed linear program:
vF = max
x∈[0,1]4
vF (x) subject to (IChGB), (IChBB), (ICB) and (D). (P )
Moreover, vF is supported by a configuration x ∈ [0, 1]4 that binds (ICB), but leaves
(IChBB) slack if λ < λ˜ and leaves (IChGB) slack if λ > λ˜.
Proof. In Appendix.
As in standard pure adverse selection problems, a sorting condition holds for announce-
ment that allows us to support the maximum FSGV by a configuration that binds (ICB).
Then, provided that the monotonicity condition (D) holds, it is optimal to announce
m = G (B) if the posterior belief that quality is good exceeds (falls short of) pib, the
level at which the seller finds the two messages equivalent. With (ICB) binding, therefore,
truthful announcement is optimal for an h-seller; and uniquely so for an `-seller if pi′g > pib
(in which case (IChBB) is redundant). Likewise, announcing B regardless of the observed
signal is uniquely optimal for an `-seller if pi′g < pib (in which case (IChGB) is redundant).
One difference from standard pure adverse selection problems, however, is that achiev-
ing the maximum surplus may but need not require binding the incentive constraints for
truthful announcement. This is because the reputational rent needed for inducing high
effort may be already sufficient for inducing truthful announcement, as elaborated in due
course.
14Existence ensues if the set of constraints is non-empty by compactness of the feasible set and continuity
of the value.
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3.3 Maximum FSGV and efficiency
We now characterize when the maximum FSGV exists, what its nature is, and how it can be
obtained, by exploring further the implications of Lemma 1 on equilibrium configuration.
Since the “punishment” payoff v is independent of the cost of effort c while the value
vF (x) decreases in c, the higher c is the harder it is to sustain the faithful strategy. This
is reflected in the conditions (ICB), (IChGB) and (IChBB) becoming harder to satisfy as
c increases. This means that a FSGV exists for all c below a threshold level. We show in
Appendix that this threshold converges, as δ tends to 1, to (recall that prices pG and pB
are functions of λ)
c (λ) :=
{
min
{
c∗ + (1−2λ)(h−`)(1−h)(pG−pB)
1−` , h− `− λ(1−h)(pG−pB)1−pB
}
if λ ≤ λ˜,
h− `− λ(1−h)(pG−pB)
1−pB −
(1−h)(pB−`)
1−` if λ ≥ λ˜.
(13)
Thus, a FSGV exists for large enough δ if and only if c < c(λ). The threshold c(λ) is
continuous but not monotone in λ, with end values of
c(0) = h− ` and c(1/2) = c∗
because pG − pB = 1 at λ = 0 and pG = pB = h at λ = 1/2.
To characterize the maximum FSGV for large enough δ, it proves useful to know which
other constraints bind at the solution x to (P ) that binds (ICB). Observe from (ICB) that
vF − v exceeds a minimal rent (1− δ)(pG − pB) independently of the effort cost c. When
c is small enough, this minimal rent should be sufficient to incentivize the seller to exert
high effort and consequently, the maximum FSGV should be achieved without binding the
incentive compatibility conditions for inducing high effort, (IChGB) or (IChBB). We show
in Appendix that this is indeed the case for large δ if c < ĉ (λ) where
ĉ (λ) :=
{
(h− `)(pG − pB)
(
1− 2λ+ λ
1−pB
)
if λ ≤ λ˜,
h− pB − λ(1−h)(pG−pB)1−pB if λ ≥ λ˜,
(14)
which is a continuous function with end values of
ĉ(0) = h− ` and ĉ(1/2) = 0.
Observe that ĉ(λ) < c(λ) for λ > λ˜ but not necessarily for λ < λ˜ . Depending on
whether λ is below or above λ˜, the details differ on how the maximum efficiency may be
achieved. Yet, a similar general insight prevails that the most effective way is to reward
good quality and truthful announcement of bad signal, as stated below.
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Proposition 2 A FSGV exists for large enough δ if and only if c ∈ (0, c¯(λ)). In this case,
the maximum FSGV, vF , is supported by a configuration x¯ = (x¯Bg, x¯Gg, x¯Bb, x¯Gb) ∈ [0, 1]4
such that
(i) x¯Bg = x¯Gg = 1 (i.e., ρ¯g = 1) and moreover,
(ii) x¯Bb = 1 and x¯Gb < 1 that binds the truth-telling constraint (ICB) if c ≤ ĉ(λ), in
which case
vF = h− c− (1− h)hλ(1− 2λ)
(1− λ)(λ+ h(1− 2λ)) , and (15)
(ii′) x¯Bb < 1 and x¯Gb < 1 that bind both (ICB) and the relevant constraint for inducing
h, namely, (IChGB) for λ ≤ λ˜ and (IChBB) for λ > λ˜, if c > ĉ(λ).15
Furthermore, vF → h− c as λ→ 0.
Proof. In Appendix.
Hence, unless the cost c is too large the seller can be incentivized to exert high effort and
truthfully disclose the interim information on quality prior to trade for an indefinite length
of time. This is achieved via rewarding the seller by never triggering the trivial equilibrium
provided that the delivered quality is good, and also provided that bad quality is disclosed
when c ≤ ĉ(λ). In this case, as the maximum surplus of h − c accrues until the trivial
equilibrium is triggered with a probability no higher than (1− h)λ in each period, a lower
bound for the maximum FSGV, vF , is obtained as
vF ≥ (1− δ) (h− c)
1− δ(1− (1− h)λ) → h− c as λ→ 0.
Since ĉ(λ)→ h− ` as λ→ 0, this means that full efficiency is achieved for all c < h− ` via
pre-trade communication as the observation error λ vanishes, which is also evident from
(15). This is the case for all large enough δ (rather than asymptotically as δ → 1).
However, vF is not monotone in λ as can be seen easily from vF in (15) being convex
in λ with a minimum at λ = λ˘ :=
√
h
1+2
√
h
< 1/3. This reflects the dual effect of noisier
signal on the truth-telling incentives: it discourages truth-telling because lying is more
likely to go undetected but also encourages it by reducing the price differential to be
exploited by lying. The latter dominates for low λ while the former may take over for
higher λ. Consequently, the maximum efficiency changes non-monotonically as the signal
gets noisier. The non-monotonic effects of λ on the incentives of truth-telling continue to
hold for c > ĉ(λ).
It may be worth noting that the solution needs not be unique. In particular, when the
signal is precise enough (λ < λ˜) and the incentive compatibility for effort is binding (c >
15The formulae of v¯F are lengthier and less intuitive to interpret for (ii
′), hence are provided in Appendix.
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ĉ(λ)), there exist other solutions where (ICB) is not binding and/or truthful announcement
of bad signal is not penalized (xBb = 1).
Having pinned down the maximum FSGV vF in Proposition 2, we are now ready to
characterize the set of equilibrium values in the communication model. Clearly, there are
self-generated values associated with seller’s strategies other than the faithful strategy. In
particular, those obtained in Proposition 1 (i.e., without communication) can be replicated
via babbling as mentioned earlier. As we show in Appendix, however, vF is the upper
bound of all self-generated values obtained with non-babbling strategies if δ is large enough
(Property 1). Thus, the higher value of vF and v
∗ is the maximum self-generated value
when pre-trade communication is possible and moreover, any value between v and this
maximum constitutes an equilibrium value by the same logic used for the case without
communication.
Proposition 3 In the communication model, for large enough δ, the set of equilibrium
values is the interval [v,max{v∗, vF}] if c < c¯(λ) and [v, v∗] otherwise.
Proof. In Appendix.
Lemma 1 established that if efficiency can be improved by allowing for pre-trade com-
munication, this is done at a maximum extent via a faithful strategy. As a consequence the
maximum value is achieved with either faithful or no communication. Communication can
help by relaxing the incentive compatibility condition for exerting high effort, thus stretch-
ing the extent to which high effort may be induced or rendering it possible to induce high
effort (where it was not possible without communication). In the next section, we fully
characterize the environments in which communication enhances welfare in either way.
We close this section with an illustration of the two thresholds c(λ) and ĉ(λ), in Figure
1-(a) for the case that h− ` is relatively large with (h, `) = (0.75, 0.25) and in Figure 1-(b)
(a) c(λ) and ĉ(λ) for large gap h− ` (b) c(λ) and ĉ(λ) for small gap h− `
Figure 1
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for the case that it is relatively small with (h, `) = (0.5, 0.4). In both diagrams, the solid
curve represents c(λ) and the dotted curve represents ĉ(λ). Both curves are continuous
with a kink at λ = λ˜. In Figure 1-(b), c(λ) has another kink below λ˜. For low c, a FSGV
exists for all λ < 1/2. In this case, the price differential is small when the signal is very
noisy as noted above, but so is the risk differential ∆b upon delivering a bad quality.
4 When is communication beneficial?
According to Proposition 2, pre-trade communication enhances welfare to the fully efficient
level as λ→ 0 if the seller is patient enough, but impairs it as c→ 0 because v∗ converges
to h while vF stays bounded away from h. In this section, we clarify how widespread is the
welfare-enhancing effect of communication by delineating the parameter values for which
a patient seller can achieve a higher value with pre-trade communication than without.
We proceed by comparing vF with v
∗.
When c ≥ c∗ so that high effort cannot be induced at all without communication,
communication is clearly beneficial so long as a FSGV exists, which is the case if c < c¯(λ)
by Proposition 2. We will elaborate later how large c¯(λ) is.
Consider the case that c < c∗ so that v∗ > v, meaning that high effort can be sus-
tained without communication to some extent, in particular, with probabilities ρ∗g = 1 and
ρ∗b < 1 after the seller delivered quality q ∈ {g, b}. In this case, communication enhances
efficiency if high effort can be induced with a larger ρb, or equivalently, with a lower prob-
ability of triggering punishment after delivery of bad quality. This is feasible in principle
because truthful communication eases the incentive constraint for inducing high effort from
(ICh) to (IChGB) by aligning the price with the realized quality. But, inducing truthful
communication adds two extra constraints (ICB) and (IChBB) as explained earlier. Each
constraint turns out to be a potential barrier that limits the benefits of communication in
certain environments.
To derive some intuition on when the optimal configuration x¯ in Proposition 2 generates
vF that exceeds v
∗, let us set xGg = xBg = 1 (so that ρg = 1) and look for the maximum
vF (x) subject only to (ICB) and (D). Since the LHS of (ICB) increases in xBb and decreases
in xGb, this maximum value is vF (xˆ) where the configuration xˆ = (1, 1, 1, xˆGb) binds (ICB).
For vF > v
∗, therefore, it is necessary that vF (xˆ) > v∗. This holds if 1−λ+λxˆGb > ρ∗b for
all large enough δ, which is verified to be the case if and only if
c > c(λ) := λ(h− `)
(pG − pB
1− pB
)
. (16)
To understand what goes on when c < c(λ), recall that inducing truthful reporting
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requires a minimal rent be given to the seller. More precisely, overstating the signal
(announcing G upon observing s = b) is discouraged by the spread ∆b = xBb − xGb in
continuation probabilities after truthful reporting of bad quality and after overstatement.
In particular, (ICB) requires that ∆b be bounded away from 0 because the future loss from
overstating a bad signal must overshadow the gain in current price, pG−pB. When c is very
small, the probability ρ∗b is very close to 1, leaving little scope to push xBb above ρ
∗
b to have
enough spread ∆b. Thus, truth-telling must be induced by decreasing xGb significantly,
sacrificing efficiency. This is the barrier stemming from the truth-telling constraint (ICB).
Therefore, for communication to enhance efficiency it is necessary that ρ∗b is not too
large, which is implied by (16). In fact, provided that a FSGV exists, (16) is also sufficient
for communication to be beneficial if
either λ < λ˜, or λ > λ˜ and c ≤ ĉ(λ). (17)
To see this, consider the configuration x∗ = (1, 1, 1, x∗Gb) where 1 − λ + λx∗Gb = ρ∗b so
that vF (x
∗) = v∗. Condition (16) implies that (ICB), as well as (D), is slack at x∗. Thus,
vF > v
∗ ensues if the incentive constraint for inducing h is also slack at x∗. This is indeed
the case if λ < λ˜ because the relevant constraint is relaxed from (ICh) to (IChGB). If
λ > λ˜ so that the relevant constraint is (IChBB), then vF > v
∗ obtains so long as c ≤ ĉ(λ)
because in that case vF is supported by the configuration xˆ according to Proposition 2.
In the remaining case that λ > λ˜ and c > ĉ(λ), the second barrier comes into play.
Specifically, at the solution configuration x¯ described in Proposition 2 where ρg = 1, the
truth-telling constraint (ICB) reduces to
∆b ≥ pG − pB
(1− pB)(h− `− c)
(
1
δ
− h− (1− h) ρb
)
, (18)
whereas the relevant incentive constraint for inducing h, (IChBB), can be rewritten as
(using xBb = ρb + λ∆b)
λ∆b ≤
(
h− pB − c
1− `
)
1− δ
δ (h− `− c) +
(
1−
(pB − `
1− `
)( 1− h
h− `− c
))
(1− ρb) . (19)
Note that this condition prevents ρb from getting too close to 1 for large λ, because pB → h
as λ→ 1/2 so that the first term on the RHS of (19) is negative. As a result, we identify
in Appendix an upper bound of λ,
λ :=
(1− h) (3h− `)
2 (2h− 1) (h− `)
(√
1 +
4 (2h− 1) (h− `)h
(3h− `)2 (1− h) − 1
)
> λ˜, 16
16If h = 12 , then λ =
1
3−2` > λ˜,
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above which communication cannot be beneficial because ρb > ρ
∗
b cannot be accommodated
jointly by (18) and (19). This is the barrier to beneficial communication stemming from
the extra condition (IChBB).
It is verified straightforwardly that c(λ) decreases in λ > λ˜ and hits c∗ at λ. It can be
further verified that c(λ) < ĉ(λ) < c(λ) for λ ∈ (λ˜, λ), leading to the following result on
the potential for communication to improve efficiency:
Proposition 4 vF > v
∗ for large enough δ if and only if
λ < λ and c(λ) < c < c(λ).
Proof. In Appendix.
The result pertains to both when c¯(λ) ≤ c∗ and when c∗ < c¯(λ) because the latter case
implies c(λ) < c∗ as shown in Appendix.
According to Proposition 4 communication does not help if the signal is too unreliable
(λ ≥ λ) or effort cost is either too small or too large. Finally, we elaborate on these
boundaries at which communication ceases to be beneficial.
To get more insight about the upper bound of the observation error that allows bene-
ficial communication, we derive the following comparative statics on λ :
Lemma 2 λ increases in `, decreases in h, and converges to 1/2 as `→ h.
Proof. In Appendix.
A higher ` and/or a lower h aggravates the moral hazard problem as it degrades ex-post
monitoring of effort by the delivered quality. Such changes in the environment permit less
precise communication to enhance efficiency, pushing up the upper bound λ. Note that λ
tends to be quite large, in particular, exceeding 0.3 for h < 0.7 even as ` → 0 where λ is
lowest.
For a given value λ < λ, the lower bound of effort cost c for beneficial communication
is c(λ) > 0. Note that c(0) = c(0.5) = 0 and c(λ) is single-peaked at λ = λ˘, the point at
which vF in (15) bottoms out. Such non-monotonic changes reflect the fundamental trade-
off we highlighted earlier, namely, that noisier signals reduce not only the price differential,
which is the short-run gain from overstating a bad signal, but also the long-run loss by
reducing the risk of getting detected.
We have shown that the range of c for which communication may improve efficiency,
(c(λ), c(λ)), converges to the full range (0, h − `) as λ → 0. Therefore, communication
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can be beneficial for the entire range of effort cost c when λ→ 0; the range of c gradually
shrinks as λ increases from 0 but may expand temporarily as λ increases further before it
reaches the upper bound λ at which the range ceases to exist.
However, if ` is sufficiently close to h, it may happen that (c(λ), c(λ)) is empty for some
intermediate values of λ ∈ (0, λ˜) because c(λ) falls below c∗ and c(λ) rises above c∗ at the
same time. Hence, the range may disappear for some intermediate values of λ < λ˜ and
reappear for higher values of λ. This observation leads to a counter-intuitive measure to
address moral hazard in sellers: if the seller’s observation of quality is not very precise and
cannot be improved easily, then making it noisier may facilitate truthful communication
by rendering overstatement less attractive and thereby, enhance efficiency.
In line with the discussions in this section, the grey area in Figure 3-(a) illustrates the
parameter values (c, λ) for which pre-trade communication is beneficial when ` is not too
close to h with the case (h, `) = (0.75, 0.25): it is below the red curve c(λ) and above the
black curve c(λ) for λ lower than λ at which c(λ) intersects the horizontal dashed line at the
level c∗. Figure 3-(b) illustrates the corresponding area when ` is closer to h with (h, `) =
(0.5, 0.4). Notice an intermediate range of λ where c(λ) ≤ c∗ ≤ c(λ), for which com-
munication cannot be beneficial for any level of the effort cost c. Consequently, there are
two disconnected regions of parameter values on which communication improves efficiency.
(a) Large gap h− ` (b) Small gap h− `
Figure 3
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined how and when cheap-talk communication by a seller can
help discipline herself and thereby, enhance efficiency and her equilibrium payoff. Gen-
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erally speaking, this is possible when the moral hazard problem is neither too mild nor
too acute and the seller’s information is not too noisy. In this case, the incentives for
effort and for truthful communication are interwoven within the same reputation mech-
anism that determines continuation equilibria based on the seller’s past performance, in
such a way that truthful communication complements the conventional reputational in-
centives by permitting immediate reward for effort via more accurate prices. This raises
the value of reputation for being trustworthy, which in turn provides credibility to seller’s
communication.
We have developed our analysis in a setting of experience good sellers, but the insight
should be more broadly applicable to situations that involve interim communication by ac-
tors who are subject to moral hazard and reputation. For instance, managers report about
likely performance, academic scholars communicate about intermediate research findings,
and doctors update the progress of treatments. As already mentioned, communication
could be used to move forward some reward in relational contracts.
In our model where actions, outcomes and signals are binary, the maximum equilib-
rium value is characterized by a well-defined linear program. This allowed us to study
systematically the impacts of signal precision on the incentives for truthful communica-
tion and consequently, to characterize fully the optimal communication and effort strategy
as well as the environments in which communication enhances welfare. It is an interesting
agenda, which we leave for future work, to investigate whether our findings are driven by
the discrete nature of our model, or they extend to richer environments that accommodate
more flexible communication and actions.17
17If the seller’s signal is perfect, however, our logic extends straightforwardly to the case of continua of
effort/quality levels and the full efficiency is achieved.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
We have shown in the main text that the maximum self-generated value is v∗ in (6) if
(7) holds, while v is the unique self-generated value if (7) fails. Thus, it remains to verify
that every v ∈ (v, v∗) is an equilibrium value if (7) holds.
Recall that v∗ in (6) is obtained with p1 = h, ρg = 1, and ρb = ρ
∗
b which is the
largest value compatible with (ICh). As (ρg − ρb)(v(p1, ρg, ρb) − v) decreases in ρb, the
value v(h, 1, ρb) constitutes a self-generated value for all ρb ∈ [0, ρ∗b ] as (ICh) is satisfied.
Thus, any value between v(h, 1, 0) and v(h, 1, ρ∗b) is self-generated. Analogously, fixing
p1 = h and ρg < 1, any value between v(h, ρg, 0) and v(h, ρg, ρ̂b(ρg)) is self-generated,
where ρ̂b(ρg) is the largest non-negative value compatible with (ICh) given p1 = h and ρg,
when it exists. Note that ρ̂b(ρg) increases in ρg because (ρg−ρb)(v(p1, ρg, ρb)−v) increases
in ρg. Thus, there is unique ρg(h) ∈ (0, 1) such that ρ̂b(ρg(h)) = 0. By continuity, the set
of self-generated values associated with p1 = h is the interval [v(h, ρg(h), 0), v(h, 1, ρ
∗
b)].
Similarly, for each p1 ∈ (`, h) the set of self-generated values is a closed interval18
with the minimum value of v(p1, ρg(p1), 0) so long as ρg(p1) ≤ 1. As ρg(p1) solves (ICh) as
equality when ρb = 0, i.e., ρg(p1) =
c
δ(c`+(h−`)(p1−`)) , we have ρg(p1) = 1 when p1 =
c(1−δ`)
δ(h−`) +`
for which v(p1, 1, 0) = v˜ :=
(1−δ)c
δ(h−`) + v. Therefore, the set of all self-generated values is the
interval [v˜, v∗].
Observe from (1− δ)c = δ(h− `)(v˜ − v) that the seller is indifferent between exerting
h and ` if the continuation payoff in period two is v˜ if q1 = g and is v if q1 = b. Given
such continuation payoffs, it is optimal for the seller to exert h with any probability
e1 ∈ [0, 1], generating the seller’s value of (1− δ)p1 + δ(e1h+ (1− e1)`)(v˜ − v) + δv where
p1 = e1(h−`)+`. These values range from v(1) = (1−δ)`+δ(`(v˜−v)+v) = v+δ`(v˜−v) < v˜
to (1 − δ)h + δ(h(v˜ − v) + v) > v˜. We refer to the values in the interval [v(1), v˜] as self-
generated with one lag. These are clearly equilibrium values.
Next, consider the seller’s value from exerting ` for the first t ≥ 1 periods, after which
the continuation value is vg ∈ [v(1), v˜] if all qualities have been good up to then but is v
otherwise. As the prices are ` in the first t periods, the set of seller’s values obtained as
such is
{v + δt`t(vg − v)|v(1) ≤ vg ≤ v˜]} = [v + δt+1`t+1(v˜ − v), v + δt`t(v˜ − v)]
which we call self-generated values with t+ 1 lags. For each such value v, the initial effort
choice of ` is optimal given that the continuation value is v if q1 = b and is a self-generated
18To be precise, it is {v(p1, ρg, ρb) |(ICh) binds for some (ρg, ρb) ∈ [0, 1]2}.
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value v′(< v˜) with t lags if q1 = g such that v + δ`(v′ − v) = v. As such, every value
v ∈ (v, v(1)) is self-generated with t lags for some t ≥ 2, which clearly is an equilibrium
value.
Lastly, we show that every value v ∈ [v, v∗] is an equilibrium value even without public
randomization. As shown above, any such value v is either self-generated or self-generated
with lags, with an associated first period strategy e1 and a continuation value vq ∈ [v, v∗]
conditional on the first period quality q ∈ {g, b}. As each vq is self-generated or self-
generated with lags, conditional on the first period quality q ∈ {g, b}, the associated second
period strategy and subsequent continuation values are specified accordingly. Proceeding
recursively, one can determine a strategy e by specifying e(Ht) for every possible history.
By construction, e(Ht) is optimal conditional on the history relative to the price schedule
defined by e and v is the associated value, completing the proof.
B. Proof of Lemma 1
A FSGV is supported by a configuration x ∈ [0, 1]4 that satisfies (ICB), (ICG), (IChGB)
and (IChBB). Since (ICB) and (ICG) imply (D), it follows that the solution value to (P ),
denoted by v¯F , is no lower than the maximum FSGV vF presuming that it exists.
Consider a solution to (P ) which is a configuration x that satisfies (IChGB), (IChBB),
(ICB) and (D), so that ∆b = xBb−xGb > 0. If both (ICB) and (D) are slack at x, one can
reduces xBb while increasing xGb to keep ρb = (1−λ)xBb+λxGb constant until either (ICB)
or (D) binds. Since this keeps vF (x) and thus (IChGB) intact while loosening (IChBB), the
modified configuration also supports v¯F . Hence, we may assume that (D) or (ICB) binds
at the solution x to (P ).
If only (D) binds at x, then xBq > 0 and xGq < 1. If xBg < xBb, raise xBg and xGg by
the same amount while reducing xBb and xGb by the same amount to keep hρg + (1− h)ρb
intact. Since this keeps (ICB) and (D) intact and loosens (IChGB) and (IChBB), we may
assume that xBg ≥ xBb at the solution x to (P ) that binds (D) but not (ICB). Then,
xGg and xGb may be raised by the same amount until (ICB) binds, which clearly keeps
(D) intact and loosens (IChBB); it also loosens (IChGB) because the direction of change
in (ρg − ρb)(vF − v) is captured by
∂
∂xGg
( ρg − ρb
1− δ(hρg + (1− h)ρb)
∣∣∣
xGb=xBb−∆g
)
=
1− δxBb + λ(δ(xBg + xBb)− 2)
(1− δ(hρg + (1− h)ρb))2
which is positive since it is linear in λ and positive at both λ = 0 and 1/2.
Consequently, there is a solution x to (P ) that binds (ICB). Then, (D) implies that
(ICG) holds at x, further implying that x supports a FSGV which is at most vF . Since
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vF ≤ v¯F as asserted earlier, we have established the equivalence of the maximum FSGV
vF and the solution value to (P ).
Finally, at a solution x to (P ) that binds (ICB), the seller is indifferent between
announcing G and B when her posterior is pib. Hence, upon observing s = g, an `-
seller would find it uniquely optimal to announce G (resp. B) if pib < pi
′
g ⇔ λ < λ˜
(resp. pib > pi
′
g ⇔ λ > λ˜) by (8). This implies that (IChBB) is slack at x if λ < λ˜ while
(IChGB) is slack if λ > λ˜.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
Since ∆q and vF (x) increase in xBq for each q ∈ {g, b}, so does the LHS of (ICB).
Moreover, with xBg = xBb = 1, the LHS of (ICB) increases in xGg and decreases in xGb for
large enough δ because the respective derivative of the LHS divided by (1− δ) converges,
as δ → 1, to
h(1− h)(h− `− c)(1− xGb)(1− 2λ)
(1− λ− h(1− 2λ))X2 > 0 and
h(1− h)(h− `− c)(xGg − 1)(1− 2λ)
(1− λ− h(1− 2λ))X2 < 0
where X = λ(1− xGb) + h(1− (1− λ)xGg − (2− xGb)λ). Hence, for (ICB) to be satisfied
by some configuration, it must be satisfied by x = (xBg, xGg, xBb, xGb) = (1, 1, 1, 0), which
is the case if and only if
c ≤ h− `− pG − pB
1− pB
(
1
δ
− h− (1− h)(1− λ)
)
−→ cICB := h− `− λ(1− h)pG − pB
1− pB
as δ → 1 where the convergence is from below. Therefore,
[C1] (ICB) holds for some configuration x for large enough δ if and only if c < cICB,
and in this case it holds at x = (1, 1, 1, 0).
Moreover, in this case the value vF (x) is maximized subject to (ICB) at xˆ = (1, 1, 1, xˆGb)
where xˆGb < 1 is the unique value at which (ICB) binds. We further establish the following.
[C2] If vF is supported by a configuration x that leaves (IChGB) and (IChBB) slack
and xGb > 0, then x = xˆ.
To prove this, consider a configuration x = (xBg, xGg, xBb, xGb) that supports vF as such.
We now prove [C2] in four steps.
Step 1. xBg = 1: If xBg < 1, increase xBg and xGg slightly keeping ∆g intact, which
would increase vF (x) without violating any constraint of the program (P ). As this would
contradict x supporting vF , we deduce that xBg = 1 must hold.
Step 2. xGg = 1 or xBb = 1: If xGg < 1 and xBb < 1, one can increase xGg and xBb by
the same amount, i.e., dxGg = dxBb = dx > 0. If pib < 1 − pib, this raises vF (x) while
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relaxing (ICB) and (D), a contradiction to x supporting vF . If pib > 1 − pib, in addition
to increasing xGg and xBb as above, one may reduce xGb so that (pib∆g + (1 − pib)∆b) is
constant, i.e., (1− 2pib)dx = (1− pib)dxGb. This increases vF (x) because
d(hρg + (1− h)ρb) =
(
1− λ+ (1− h)λ1− 2pib
1− pib
)
dx > (1− 2λh) dx
where the inequality follows from 1−2h
1−h <
1−2pib
1−pib < 0, thus relaxing (ICB) as well as (D),
again a contradiction.
Step 3. xGg = xBb = 1: If xGg = 1 > xBb, increase xBb. If xGg < 1 = xBb, increase xGg
and decrease xGb in such a way that pib∆g+(1−pib)∆b is intact, i.e., pibdxGg+(1−pib)dxGb =
0 and thus
d(hρg + (1− h)ρb) = h(1− λ)dxGg + (1− h)λdxGb > (1− λ)[hdxGg + (1− h)dxGb] > 0.
Either case, vF (x) increases while maintaining (ICB) and (D), a contradiction to x sup-
porting vF .
Step 4. xˆ supports vF : By Steps 1–3, vF is supported by a configuration x = (1, 1, 1, xGb)
at which (IChGB) and (IChBB) are slack, as well as (D). Therefore, (ICB) must bind be-
cause otherwise xGb may be increased without violating any constraint. This proves [C2].
When [C2] applies, the solution is xˆ where
xˆGb =
δ(1− pB) (h− `− c)− (pG − pB)(1− δ + δ(1− h)λ)
δ[(1− pB) (h− `− c)− (pG − pB) (1− h)λ] (20)
and vF (xˆ) is routinely calculated as the formula in (15).
The proof now proceeds differently between the two cases λ ≤ λ˜ and λ > λ˜.
C.1 Case where λ ≤ λ˜
In this case we focus on (IChGB), (ICB) and (D) because the three conditions, with
(ICB) binding, imply (IChBB). As vF (x) increases in ρg, for (IChGB) to hold at any x it
must holds at ρg = 1 which is written as
δ (1− ρb) (1− h)
(1− δh− δ (1− h) ρb)
≥ (c− (h− `) (1− 2λ) (pG − pB)) (1− h)
(h− `) (h− `− c) . (21)
The LHS decreases in ρb, and it is less than 1 and converges to 1 as δ → 1 for all ρb < 1.
Hence, (IChGB) may hold at some x for large enough δ if and only if the RHS is strictly
less than 1, which is calculated to be the case if and only if
c < cICh := c
∗ + (1− 2λ)(h− `)(1− h)
1− ` (pG − pB).
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Note that, in this case, (IChGB) holds at every x = (1, 1, xBb, xGb) 6= (1, 1, 1, 1) for
δ large enough because the LHS of (21) converges to 1 as δ → 1. Together with [C1],
therefore, both (IChGB) and (ICB) hold at some x when δ is large enough if and only if
c < min{cICh, cICB} = c(λ). Since in this case they both hold at x = (1, 1, 1, 0) which also
satisfies (D), a FSGV exists for large enough δ if and only if c ∈ (0, c(λ)), thus so does
the maximum FSGV, vF , by the Maximum theorem (as the objective function of (P ) is
continuous subject to a compact constraint set).
Suppose c < c(λ), so that vF exists. Since x = (1, 1, 1, 0) satisfies (IChGB), (ICB)
and (D) strictly in this case, we have vF > vF (1, 1, 1, 0). Thus, any configuration x =
(xBg, xGg, xBb, xGb) supporting vF must have xGb > 0.
Hence, if vF is supported by a configuration at which (IChGB) is slack, it must be xˆ =
(1, 1, 1, xˆGb) by [C2], and thus, (IChGB) must be slack at xˆ. Given xGg = xBg = xBb = 1,
it is routinely verified that the LHS of (IChGB) decreases in xGb, hence it binds at a unique
x′Gb < 1 and hold at all lower xGb. It is straightforward to verify (by Mathematica) that
xˆGb ≤ x′Gb for large enough δ if and only if
c ≤ (h− `)(pG − pB)
(
1− 2λ+ λ
1− pB
)
= ĉ(λ).
This verifies that vF is supported by x = (1, 1, 1, xˆGb) for large enough δ if c ≤ ĉ(λ),
establishing Proposition 2 for λ ≤ λ˜ when c ≤ ĉ(λ).
If c > ĉ(λ), on the other hand, vF cannot be supported by a configuration at which
(IChGB) is slack by [C2], thus it is supported by x = (xBg, xGg, xBb, xGb) that binds
(IChGB). Note that x
′ = (1, 1, 1, x′Gb) binds (IChGB) and satisfies (ICB) and (D) loosely.
If vF (x) > vF (x
′), then ρb must be higher at x than x
′, but then the LHS of (IChGB)
is lower at x than x′ because the LHS of (IChGB) increases in ρg and decreases in ρb, a
contradiction to x supporting vF . Therefore, vF is supported by x
′, and vF (x′) is calculated
(by Mathematica) as
vF (x
′) = −c(1− `)
h− ` +
1− h(1− 2λ)2 − 3λ(1− λ)
h(1− 2λ)2(1− h) + λ(1− λ)h.
However, since (ICB) is slack at x′, there is flexibility in choosing xBb and xGb because
only ρb matters for vF (x) and (IChGB). Thus we can also obtain vF with (ICB) binding,
by reducing xBb from 1 and increasing xGb from x
′
Gb keeping ρb intact until (ICB) binds.
Note that (D) holds because ∆g = 0.
This establishes Proposition 2 for λ ≤ λ˜.
Discussion of the thresholds
In fact, the thresholds are related as follows:
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cICh − ĉ(λ) = (h− `)A(λ) and cICB − ĉ(λ) = (1− `)A(λ)
where
A(λ) := (1− `)
[
h− `
1− ` (1− (pG − pB)(1− 2λ))−
λ(pG − pB)
1− pB
]
=
λh
[
h−`
h(1−`)(1− λ)2 − (1− 2λ)(hλ+ (1− h)(1− λ))
]
(1− λ)(h(1− λ) + (1− h)λ)(hλ+ (1− h)(1− λ) . (22)
Hence either ĉ(λ) < c(λ) = cICh < cICB or c(λ) = cICB < cICh < ĉ(λ). The latter case
occurs when (IChGB) is easier to satisfy than (ICB) so that the truth-telling rent, the RHS
of (ICB), is sufficient to induce h. In the former case (IChGB) becomes more stringent than
(ICB) when the effort cost c is large enough.
Observe that ĉ(λ) < c(λ) when A(λ) > 0 and ĉ(λ) > c(λ) when A(λ) < 0. Note that
r := h−`
h(1−`) decreases from 1 to 0 as ` increases from 0 to h. Given any λ, in particular,
c(λ) < ĉ(λ) if ` is close enough to h.
To check the sign of A(λ) by that of the term in the bracket of (22), we note that
B(λ) = r
(1− λ)2
(1− 2λ) − (hλ+ (1− h)(1− λ))
is convex and B(0) = r+h− 1 and B′(0) < 0. Since λ˜ = r−1+
√
1−r
r
from h(1−r)
1−rh = `, we get
B(λ˜) =
r(1−√1− r)2
(2− r − 2√1− r) − (h(r − 1 +
√
1− r) + (1− h)(1−√1− r))
≥
(
r(1−√1− r)
2− r − 2√1− r − 1
)
(1−√1− r) > 0
Therefore,
• If B(0) ≤ 0⇔ r+h ≤ 1, then we have ĉ(λ) < c(λ) = cICh for λ above some threshold
while c(λ) = cICB < ĉ(λ) below the threshold.
• If r+ h > 1 and r is not too large, then ĉ(λ) < c¯(λ) = cICh for λ small or close to λ˜,
but c(λ) = cICB < ĉ(λ) holds in some interior interval.
• Finally, when r + h > 1 and r is large (` is small) so that (1−λ)2
(1−2λ) > 1, then ĉ(λ) <
c(λ) = cICh for all λ.
C.2 Case λ > λ˜
In this case we focus on (IChBB), (ICB) and (D) because the three conditions, with
(ICB) binding, imply (IChGB). Recall that (ICB) holds for some x for large enough δ if
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and only if c < cICB, in which case xˆ = (1, 1, 1, xˆGb) maximizes vF (x) subject to (ICB),
and binds (ICB). It is straightforward to verify that (IChBB) holds at xˆ if and only if
c ≤ ĉ(λ) = h−pB−λ(1−h)pG − pB
1− pB =
(1− 2λ)2(1− h)h2
(1− λ)(h+ λ(1− 2h))(1− h− λ(1− 2h)) . (23)
Since ĉ(λ) < cICB and xˆ satisfies (D), it follows that vF = vF (xˆ) if c ≤ ĉ(λ), establishing
Proposition 2 for λ > λ˜ and c ≤ ĉ(λ).
Next, for the remaining case that c > ĉ(λ) so that (IChBB) fails at xˆ, consider a
configuration x = (xBg, xGg, xBb, xGb) that supports vF , presuming it exists. First we
show that
xGg = 1 or xGb = 0 (24)
must hold. To verify this, suppose to the contrary that xGg < 1 and xGb > 0. Then, one can
increase xGg and decrease xGb, while increasing hρg+(1−h)ρb, i.e. pigdxGg+(1−pig)dxGb >
0, and increasing pib∆g + (1−pib)∆b, i.e. pibdxGg + (1−pib)dxGb < 0. This would increase
vF while relaxing (ICB), (D) and (IChBB), a contradiction. Hence, (24) must hold.
Also, we verify that
∆b = ∆g or xBg = 1. (25)
Suppose otherwise, i.e., ∆b > ∆g and xBg < 1. Then, since ∆b > 0 by (ICB), one can
reduce xBb and increase xBg while keeping hρg + (1−h)ρb constant, so that hλdxBg + (1−
h)(1 − λ)dxBb = 0 ⇔ pibdxBg + (1 − pib)dxBb = 0 and `dxBg + (1 − `)dxBb < 0 because
` < pib for λ > λ˜. This would keep vF (x) constant while relaxing (IChBB) and (ICB)
because dxBg = d∆g and dxBb = d∆b. As (D) remains slack, vF (x) can be increased above
vF , a contradiction. Thus, (25) must hold.
Given (24) and (25), there are three possibilities in which x may support vF : (i) xBg =
xGg = 1, (ii) xGb = 0 and xBg = 1, (iii) xGb = 0, ∆b = ∆g and xBg < 1. We examine
these possibilities below.
We start with possibility (i) xBg = xGg = 1, so that ρg = 1. Solve binding (IChBB)
and (ICB) simultaneously to get the solution:
x˘Bb =
(1− δ`) [(1− pB)(h− `− c)− (pG − pB) (1− h)λ]− (1− δh) (1− pB) (pB − `)
δ(1− `) [(1− pB)(h− `− c)− (pG − pB) (1− h)λ]− δ (1− h) (1− pB) (pB − `)
x˘Gb = x˘Bb − (pG − pB) (1− δh− δ (1− h) x˘Bb)
δ [(1− pB)(h− `− c)− (pG − pB) (1− h)λ] .
Note that x˘Bb can be rewritten as
x˘Bb =
(1− δ`)(c(λ, δ)− c)
(1− δ`)(c(λ, δ)− c) + (1− δ)(c− ĉ(λ))
where c(λ, δ) = h− `− (1− δh)(pB − `)
(1− δ`) − λ(1− h)
pG − pB
1− pB > ĉ(λ).
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Hence, x˘Bb ∈ (0, 1) if and only if ĉ(λ) < c < c(λ, δ). In this case, the initial formula of x˘Bb
implies (1− pB)(h− `− c)− (pG− pB)(1−h)λ > 0 and thus, x˘Gb < x˘Bb and both x˘Bb and
x˘Gb converge to 1 from below as δ → 1. This implies that x˘ = (1, 1, x˘Bb, x˘Gb) supports a
FSGV that dominates any FSGV with xGb = 0 required by possibility (ii) and (iii).
For c ∈ (ĉ(λ), c(λ)) and large enough δ, therefore, vF must be supported by a configu-
ration x with xGb > 0 and moreover, (IChBB) binds at x by [C2] because xˆ fails (IChBB) in
the current case. Since we may assume that (ICB) binds at a configuration that supports
vF by Lemma 1, we deduce that x˘ = (1, 1, x˘Bb, x˘Gb) supports vF for large enough δ, which
is calculated (by Mathematica) as
vF (x˘) = −c(1− `)
h− ` −
[ `(1− λ)λ2 + h2(1− 2λ)(λ2 − λ+ (1− `)(1− 2λ))
−h(1− 4λ+ 5λ2 − λ3 − `(1− 3λ+ λ2 + 2λ3))
]
(h− `)(1− λ)[h(1− 2λ)2(1− h) + λ(1− λ)] h.
This establishes Proposition 2 for λ > λ˜ and ĉ(λ) < c < c(λ).
It remains to consider c > c(λ) for λ > λ˜. If vF is supported by x that conforms to
possibility (i) but xGb > 0 (hence, neither (ii) and (iii)), then x must bind (IChBB) by
[C2] because xˆ fails (IChBB), and x may also bind (ICB) by Lemma 1 but no such x exists
as shown above.
Hence, it suffices to consider only (ii) and (iii). We may assume that (ICB) binds by
Lemma 1. If (IChBB) is slack, xBb = 1 must hold because otherwise raising xBb would
increase vF (x) maintaining (ICB) and (D), a contradiction; but xBb = 1 is inconsistent
with (ii) because binding (ICB) would imply vF (x) − v → 0 as δ → 1, contradicting
(IChBB), nor is it with (iii) because it would imply ∆b = 1 > ∆g.
Therefore, vF should be supported by a configuration that binds both (ICB) and
(IChBB), but we show this is impossible for large enough δ below, thus completing the
proof of Proposition 2.
Possibility (ii): Suppose xGb = 0 and xBg = 1. Solving the simultaneous equation sys-
tem consisting of the binding constraints (IChBB) and (ICB), and evaluating the solution
value of xGg at the limit δ = 1 gives
(h− `− c)(1− `)− (pG − pB)(1− `)[h+ λ− 2hλ]− (pB − `)[1− hλ− pB(h+ λ− 2hλ)]
(h− `− c)pB(1− `)− (pG − pB)(1− `)h(1− λ)− (pB − `)[h− hλ+ pB(1− 2h− λ+ 2hλ)]
which obtains a value of 1 at c = c(λ). Moreover, its derivative w.r.t. c is
(1− `)[pB(λ+ h(1− 2λ))− h(1− λ)][p2B − 2`pB + pG(`− 1) + `](
(h− `− c)pB(1− `)− (pG − pB)(1− `)h(1− λ)− (pB − `)[h(1− λ) + pB(1− 2h− λ+ 2hλ)]
)2
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which is positive because i) pB(λ + h(1− 2λ))− h(1− λ) < 0 given pB < h if λ > λ˜ and
ii) p2B − 2`pB + pG(` − 1) + ` < p2B − 2`pB + h(` − 1) + ` < 0 for ` < pB < h. Thus, we
have shown that the unique solution value of xGg to binding (IChBB) and (ICB) exceeds
1 for c > c(λ) and large enough δ, hence no legitimate solution exists in the current case.
Possibility (iii): Suppose xGb = 0, ∆b = ∆g and xBg < 1. Solving the simultaneous
equation system consisting of the binding constraints (IChBB) and (ICB), and evaluating
the solution value of xBg at the limit δ = 1 gives
xBg|δ=1 = c+ pB + (pG − pB)(λ− `+ 2h(1− λ))− h
c`+ `(`− 2h− (pG − pB)(1− λ− h+ 2hλ)) + hpG . (26)
The derivative of this w.r.t. c is
∂xBg|δ=1
∂c
=
(h− `)(pG(1− `) + pB`− `)
[c`+ `(`− 2h− (pG − pB)(1− λ− h+ 2hλ)) + hpG]2
which is positive because pG(1 − `) + pB` − ` exceeds its value at pG = h and pB = `,
namely (h− `)(1− `), given λ > λ˜.
Moreover, we calculate that (26) has a value of 1 at
c =
`(`− 2h)− (pG − pB)(2h+ (1− `)(1− 2h)λ− `h) + h(1 + pG)− pB
1− ` .
Since subtracting this from c(λ) gives
(h(1− pB)− λ(pB(1− 2h) + h))(pG − pB)
1− pB =
(1− 2λ)(1− h)h(pG − pB)
(1− h− λ(1− 2h))(1− pB) > 0,
(26) obtains a value of 1 at some c < c(λ) and thus exceeds 1 for c ≥ c(λ). Hence, no
legitimate solution exists for c > c(λ) and large enough δ.
D. Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a non-trivial self-generated value, SGV for short, for which the seller may
mix h and ` and/or report less than fully truthfully. We allow an arbitrary finite number
of messages to encompass noisy communication of the signal as well as of the effort.
For any message m used in the period strategy supporting the SGV, associated are
continuation values denoted by vmq for each q ∈ {g, b}. The “(continuation) spread” of
message m refers to vmg − vmb. Each vmq is between the SGV itself and v, which we
describe as being “feasible.”
By an “agent e-s” we refer to a seller who exerted e ∈ {h, `} and observed s ∈ {g,b}.
Let pies = pis if e = h and pi
e
s = pi
′
s if e = `. For each message m used for a SGV, the seller’s
payoff from sending m is linear in pies with a slope equal to the spread×δ:
U(m,pies) := (1− δ)pm + δ[pies(vmg − vmb) + vmb].
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Imagine the upper envelope of all the graphs of U(m,pi) for all m on pi ∈ [pi′b, pig]. The
optimal message(s) for each agent e-s are those whose graphs constitute the upper envelope
at pi = pies. We may disregard any message whose graph is disjoint from the upper envelope.
From the above, we have the following observations [i]–[v] on the seller behavior supporting
a SGV, that hold for all λ ∈ (0, 1/2).
[i] If agents e-s and e’-s’ find it optimal to send m and m′, respectively, then the spread
of m is weakly larger than that of m′ if pies ≥ pie′s′ from the discussion above, or
equivalently, because
(1− δ)pm + δ[piesvmg + (1− pies)vmb] ≥ (1− δ)pm′ + δ[piesvm′g + (1− pies)vm′b]
(1− δ)pm + δ[pie′s′vmg + (1− pie
′
s′)vmb] ≤ (1− δ)pm′ + δ[pie
′
s′vm′g + (1− pie
′
s′)vm′b]
=⇒ pies[(vmg − vmb)− (vm′g − vm′b)] ≥ pie
′
s′ [(vmg − vmb)− (vm′g − vm′b)].
[ii] Each used message is optimal for an “adjacent” set of agents, i.e., all agents with pies
in a certain interval. Multiple messages optimal for multiple agents must have the
same graph, hence same spread, vmg − vmb, and same intercept, (1− δ)pm + δvmb.
[iii] Any two messages m and m′ optimal for all agents in a given set of agents can be
replaced, without affecting optimality conditions, by a new message obtained by the
convex combination of m and m′ with weights equal to their respective probabilities
relative to total probability. Hence, one may assume at most one message that
is optimal for and only for all agents in any given “adjacent” subset of agents.19
Moreover, if such a message exists for an adjacent set of agents, then it is the unique
message commonly optimal for any non-singleton subset of those agents.
[iv] If h is exerted with positive probability, the spread of any message optimal for the
agent h-g is positive: otherwise, the spread of every used message would be non-
positive and thus, the upper envelope of the graphs of all messages is non-positively
sloped. This would mean that the optimal expected payoff is no lower for an `-seller
than for an h-seller so that exerting h is suboptimal considering the cost c > 0,
contrary to h being exerted.
[v] Consider two used messagesm andm′ with associated prices pm and pm′ , respectively,
such that pm < pm′ and the spread of m
′ is larger than that of m which is positive.
Consider a third message m′′ with pm < pm′′ < pm′ followed by continuation values
vm′′q = vmq − (1 − δ)(pm′′ − pm)/δ for q ∈ {g, b}. Then, the expected payoff from
19Note that this doesn’t prevent that several messages be optimal for any given agent.
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sendingm andm′′ are identical for all agents and vm′′q is feasible. It is feasible because
the agent who uses m must weakly prefer sending m′′ to m′, which implies, together
with both the price and the spread being larger for m′ than m′′, that vm′′q ≥ vm′b.
With these observations at hand, we now show that there is no SGV larger than
max{v∗, vF} in Step 1 and Step 2 below. Then, we show that all values in [v,max{v∗, vF}]
can be achieved as equilibrium values in Step 3.
STEP 1: Mixing h and ` does not increase the seller’s value.
We will show that for any SGV for which h and ` are mixed, there is a weakly higher
SGV supported by a period strategy where effort is not mixed, if δ < 1 is large enough.
Lemma 3 Consider a SGV v′ > v for which h and ` are mixed.
(a) If a message G′ is used by agent h-g with pG′ ≤ pig and B′ 6= G′ is used by agent h-b
with pB′ ≤ pib, then there is a weakly higher SGV for which effort is not mixed.
(b) If a message G′ is used by agent `-g and B′ 6= G′ is used by agent `-b, then either
pG′ > pi
′
g or pB′ > pi
′
b.
Proof. Part (a). Consider a SGV v′ > v as above. We build a weakly higher SGV
supported by a period strategy in which h is exerted for sure, and alternative messages G′′
and B′′ with prices pG′′ ≤ pig and pB′′ = pib, together with suitably modified continuation
values. Recall that payoff from sending message m depends only on (1− δ)pm + δvmb and
the spread vmg − vmb (observation [i]).
If pG′ = pig and pB′ = pib, then v
′ can be supported by the seller exerting h for sure
and sending G′ (B′) after good (bad) signal, i.e., without mixing h and `. Hence, suppose
pG′ < pig or pB′ < pib, and consider hypothetical messages denoted by G
′
d and B
′
d with
associated prices higher than pG′ and pB′ , respectively, by the same amount d > 0, keeping
the continuation values unchanged. Increase d until either pB′d hits pib or pG′d hits pig.
Case 1. pig − pG′ ≥ pib − pB′ : In this case, pB′d hits pib, say at d = d1, before pG′d hits pig.
At this point, given the two messages B′d1 and G
′
d1
, the seller finds it optimal to exert h and
report B′d1 after s = b and G
′
d1
after s = g (because the payoff from exerting h increased
by pib − pB′ and that from ` increased by no more). This generates a value strictly larger
than v′ and all continuation values are clearly “feasible” since they did not change. Note
also that pG′d1
> pG′ > pib because G
′ is sent by no agent e-s with pies < pib to self-generate
v′ initially (observation [iii]).
Now, increase pG′d until either it reaches pig or agent h-b becomes indifferent between
B′d1 and G
′
d. At that point, exerting h is optimal conditional on M = {G′d, B′d1} (because
an `-seller benefits less from increased pG′d given that it announces B
′
d1
if s = b and thus
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announces G′d less often than an h -seller) and h-seller’s value is v
′′ > v′. In the case that
pG′d reaches pig first, v
′′ is the value of an equilibrium in which the seller exerts h for sure
and sends B′d1 after s = b and G
′
d after s = g. In the alternative case that pG′d < pig reaches
a point at which agent h-b becomes indifferent between B′d1 and G
′
d, v
′′ is an equilibrium
value where agent h-b mixes between B′d1 and G
′
d appropriately so that pG′d is the price for
the message G′d obtained by Bayes rule. In either case, by Property 1 (p.12), v
′′ is SGV
supported by a period strategy in which h is exerted for sure as desired.
Case 2. pig − pG′ < pib − pB′ : Next, consider the case that pG′d hits pig first at d = d1.
If the spread of B′ is positive, then use observation [v] to replace message B′d1 by an
equivalent message B′′ with price pB′′ = pib (use m = G′d1 , m
′ = B′d1 and pm′′ = pib in [v]).
Then the SGV v′ can be supported with effort h only and messages G′′ = G′d1 and B
′′.
If the spread of B′ is negative, consider a modified message B′d by increasing pB′d toward
pib while decreasing δvB′dg/(1 − δ) and δvB′db/(1 − δ) by the same amount to keep B′d to
be “equivalent” with B′d1 for every agent. If pB′d reaches pib before vB′dg hits v, a higher
equilibrium value is supported by a seller exerting h for sure and reporting B′d when s = b
and and G′d1 when s = g (because the payoff should have increased weakly more for h-seller
than for `-seller), which is also a SGV by Property 1.
In the alternative case that vB′dg hits v before pB′d reaches pib, say at d = d2. Continue
to increase pB′d to pib while decreasing vB′db to keep the payoff of agent h-b from sending
B′d, i.e. (1 − δ)pB′d + δpib(v − vB′db) + δvB′db, constant. Note that pB′d reaches pib, say at
d = d3 > d2, before vB′db hits v, because otherwise the payoff of agent h-b from sending B
′
d
would be less than (1− δ)pib + δv which is strictly less than that from sending G′. During
the process from d2 to d3, the payoff from sending B
′
d decreases for pi < pib and increases
for pi > pib.
At d = d3, the payoff of exerting h (and announcing B
′
d3
after s = b and G′d1 after s = g)
remains unchanged since d = d1. On the other hand, the maximum payoff from exerting
` decreased if λ ≥ λ˜, because then given pi`b < pi`g ≤ pib sending B′d is optimal for both `-g
and `-b and the payoff from it remained the same for d ∈ (d1, d2) but decreased after d = d2
as noted above. Even when λ < λ˜ so that pi`b < pib < pi
`
g, if `-seller’s payoff increased after
d = d2, then B
′
d should be optimal at d = d3 for agent `-g as well as `-b, implying that the
payoff from sending B′d regardless of the signal, (1− δ)pB′d + δ`(v− vB′db) + δvB′db, increased
for d ∈ (d2, d3). For this, since (1− δ)pB′d + δ(1−pib)vB′db remains constant for d ∈ (d2, d3),
we would need δ(pib − `)vB′db increase, implying that pib < `. But, then `-seller’s payoff
from sending B′d at d = d3, denoted by v, would have to satisfy
v ≤ (1− δ)`+ δ`(v − v) + δv ≤ (1− δ)`+ δv =⇒ v ≤ ` = v,
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contradicting v ≥ v′ > v.
Hence, at d = d3 withM = {G′d1 , B′d3} and continuation values specified above, exerting
h must be optimal, followed by B′d3 after s = b and G
′
d1
after s = g. As this constitutes
an equilibrium with a value v′′ > v′ and continuation values lower than v′′, by Property 1
v′′ is a FSGV as desired.
Part (b). If pG′ ≤ pi′g and pB′ ≤ pi′b, the value v′ from optimally exerting ` and sending
messages G′ and B′ after respective signals is at most
(1− δ)[(`(1− λ) + (1− `)λ)pi′g + (`λ+ (1− `)(1− λ))pi′b]+ δv′ ≤ (1− δ)`+ δv′,
leading to v′ ≤ ` = v, a contradiction.
Consider an arbitrary SGV v′ > v for which h and ` are mixed. Suppose there is a
message, say H, used by both agents h-g and h-b in the period strategy supporting v′ such
that pH ≤ h. When H is modified by increasing the price to h with the same continuation
values, it remains optimal for the seller to exert h and send the message H regardless of
signal, which constitutes an equilibrium with a higher value. By Property 1, therefore, a
higher SGV exists for which effort is not mixed.
Hence, suppose that pH > h for any message H used by both agents h-g and h-b (in
the period strategy supporting v′). Clearly, pG′ ≤ pig for any message G′ used by agent
h-g. If there is a message used by agent h-b, say B′, such that pB′ ≤ pib , there is a SGV
v′′ ≥ v′ for which effort is not mixed by Lemma 3 (a).
Hence, suppose that pB′ > pib for any message B
′ used by h-b, so that it must be
shared by an agent with a higher posterior on the item’s quality. If all such messages are
shared by agent h-g but not by `-g, which must the case if λ ≥ λ˜ so that pi′g ≤ pib < pig,
then not all of them may carry prices exceeding h since the mean of those prices cannot
exceed h, contrary to the supposition above.
Thus, assume λ < λ˜ (so that pib < pi
′
g < pig) and thus, all messages used by h-b are
shared by `-g. Suppose any of them, say H, is also shared by h-g, whence agent `-g uses
H for sure by [iii].20 If agent h-b also uses H for sure, we would have pH ≤ max{pi′g, h},
necessitating h < pi′g for pH > h. Then, agent `-b should use H for sure as well due to
Lemma 3 (b), contradicting pH > h. If agent h-b uses a message different from H, on the
other hand, the associated price is no higher than pib as it is not shared by `-g or h-g, and
a higher SGV exists for which effort is not mixed by Lemma 3 (a).
In the remaining case that h-b shares every message with `-g but not with h-g, the
associated price is at most pi′g and thus, by Lemma 3 (b) agent `-b must share all messages
20As no other message than H can be shared with types h-g and h-b, any other message used by `-g
would be preferred to H by type h-g or type h-b.
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with agents h-b and `-g. For any such message (unique by [iii]), say L, we have pL ≤
max{`, pib}. Recall that we assumed pib < pL for a message played by type h-b which
implies that pL ≤ ` . Then, since exerting ` is optimal in the period strategy, we would
have v′ ≤ (1− δ)pL + δv′ ≤ (1− δ)`+ δv′ so that v′ ≤ `, contradicting v′ > v.
STEP 2: Not fully truthful announcements do not increase the seller’s value
We now consider SGV’s for which effort is not mixed in the period strategy. If the
effort exerted is `, the associated SGV is clearly ` = v. We show below that any SGV
vh (> v) for which the seller exerts h for sure but does not report the signal fully truthfully,
is no higher than max{v∗, vF} if c < h− ` and δ is large enough.
By observation [iii], we may consider only up to three used messages with at most one
of them being sent by both agent h-g and agent h-b. Hence, there are three possibilities
to consider as below.
Possibility 1: Suppose that an h-seller always announces a message G after s = g, but
after s = b she announces G and B with probability θ ∈ (0, 1) and 1− θ, respectively. We
call the associated SGV a semi-faithfully SGV. Then, the price remains at pB after m = B
but changes to
pθG := pG −
κ(θ)
h(1− λ) + (1− h)λ > h > pB > `
after m = G where
κ(θ) :=
h(1− h)(1− 2λ)θ
h(1− λ) + (1− h)λ+ (hλ+ (1− h)(1− λ))θ < h(1− h)
and the value (computed from truthful reporting out of indifference) is
vh(x) =
(1− δ)(h− `− c− κ(θ))
1− δ (hρg + (1− h)ρb) + v
We assume h− `− c− κ(θ) > 0 because vh(x) > v.
The maximum semi-faithfully SGV, which we denote by vh if exists, is the solution
value to the program
vh = max
x∈[0,1]4
vh(x) (27)
subject to (IChGB), (IChBB), (ICB) and (D) with pG replaced by p
θ
G and vF (x) by vh(x),
and the additional restriction that (ICB) binds at x.
In the proof of Lemma 1, to prove that vF is supported by a configuration that binds
(ICB), the actual value of pG was not used but only the fact that pG ∈ (h, 1). Therefore,
Lemma 1 extends to establish that the maximum semi-faithfully SGV, vh, is also the
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solution value to the program (27) without requiring that (ICB) bind at x, which is how
we treat (27) from now on. Then, various results on vF extend to vh as described below.
We start with the observation that vh is dominated by vF for large enough δ if the
latter also exists:
Lemma 4 If c < c¯(λ) then vh ≤ vF for large enough δ if vh exists.
Proof. Consider a maximum semi-faithfully SGV vh supported by a configuration x
such that xGb → 1 as δ → 1 (because otherwise vh < vF for large enough δ by Proposition
2). By observations [i]–[v] above, the payoff from sending m = B is U(B, pi) = (1− δ)pB +
δ[pi(vBg − vBb) + vBb] and that from sending m = G is U(G, pi) = (1 − δ)pθG + δ[pi(vGg −
vGb) + vGb] such that U(B, pib) = U(G, pib) and vGg − vGb > max{0, vBg − vBb}. Since
xGb → 1 ⇔ vGb → vh as δ → 1, one can find v′Gb ∈ (v, vGb) such that
(1− δ)(pig − pθG) = δ(1− pig)(vGb − v′Gb)
so that (1 − δ)pig + δ[pi(vGg − v′Gb) + v′Gb] is equal to U(G, pi) at pi = pig but lower than
U(G, pi) at pi < pig. Hence, when p
θ
G is replaced by pG = pig and vGb by v
′
Gb, the seller
would find the faithful strategy optimal and thus, vh can be generated as a FSGV.
By the same reasoning as in [C1] of the proof of Proposition 2, (ICB) must hold at
(1, 1, 1, 0) for any x to bind (ICB), which is the case for large δ only if
c < cθICB := h− `− κ(θ)− λ(1− h)
pθG − pB
1− pB < cICB
where the latter inequality follows from
−κ(θ) + λ(1− h)κ(θ)
(1− pB)(h(1− λ) + (1− h)λ) < 0 (28)
because λ(1−h)
(1−pB)(h(1−λ)+(1−h)λ) <
λ(1−h)
(1−pB)(h(1−λ)+(1−h)λ)
∣∣
pB=h
< 1. In addition, for λ ≤ λ˜,
analogously to the first paragraph of Case C.1 in the proof of Proposition 2, (IChGB) may
hold for some x only if
c < c∗ + (1− 2λ)(h− `)(1− h)
1− ` (p
θ
G − pB)− κ(θ)
h− `
1− ` < cICh.
Hence, for λ ≤ λ˜, if a semi-faithfully SGV exists then c < c(λ) and thus, vh ≤ vF by
Lemma 4.
Next, consider the case that λ > λ˜. Assume c < cθICB so that (ICB) is satisfied at
some x, thus at x = (1, 1, 1, 0). Again, the arguments for the Case C.2 in the proof of
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Proposition 2 extend to the current case with pB replaced by p
θ
B and vF (x) by vh(x). In
particular, (ICB) holding at x = (1, 1, 1, 0) implies that vh(x) is maximized subject to
(ICB) and (D) at xˆθ = (1, 1, 1, xˆθGb) that binds (ICB). Since (IChBB) is satisfied at xˆ
θ if
and only if
c ≤ ĉθ(λ) = h− pB − κ(θ)− λ(1− h)p
θ
G − pB
1− pB < ĉ(λ)
where the latter inequality is due to (28), it follows that v¯h = vh(xˆ
θ) if c ≤ ĉθ(λ), in which
case vh ≤ vF by Lemma 4 because ĉ(λ) < c(λ) for λ > λ˜.
In addition, for c > ĉθ(λ), the arguments in Case C.2 establish that (24) and (25) must
hold at the solution x to (27), leaving three cases to consider: (i) xBg = xGg = 1, (ii)
xGb = 0 and xBg = 1, (iii) xGb = 0, ∆b = ∆g and xBg < 1. The analyses for these cases
also extend straightforwardly with suitable modifications as summarized below. Used in
this process is the claim [C2] which is straightforwardly verified to hold for vh as well.
For the case (i) xBg = xGg = 1, the solution values x˘Bb and x˘Gb that bind both (ICB)
and (IChBB) are of the same formulae as before with c replaced by c+κ(θ) and pG by p
θ
G,
thus a legitimate solution exists only if
c < cθ(λ) = h− `− κ(θ)− (1− δh)(pB − `)
(1− δ`) − λ(1− h)
pθG − pB
1− pB < c(λ)
where the inequality follows from (28). In this case, (IChBB) must bind at a configuration
supporting vh by [C2], where (ICB) also binds by Lemma 1. Thus, (1, 1, x˘Bb, x˘Gb) supports
vh if c ∈ (ĉθ(λ), cθ(λ)), whence vh ≤ vF by Lemma 4.
For the remaining case that λ > λ˜ and c ≥ cθ(λ), we may focus on possibilities (ii) and
(iii) and (IChBB) should bind at the configuration that supports vh for the same reasoning
as in Case C.2 of proof of Proposition 2, where we may assume (ICB) also binds by Lemma
1. But, such a configuration does not exist for large enough δ as asserted below.
For the possibility (ii) xGb = 0 and xBg = 1, the solution value xGg|δ=1 obtains a value
of 1 at c = cθ(λ)|δ=1 < c(λ) and increases in c because its derivative w.r.t. c is of the same
formula as in C.2 with c replaced by c+ κ(θ) and pG by p
θ
G. Hence, no legitimate solution
exists. For (iii) xGb = 0, ∆b = ∆g and xBg < 1, again the suitably modified solution
value of xBg increases in c and exceeds 1 at c = c
θ(λ) by the same reasoning, precluding
any legitimate solution.
Possibility 2: Suppose that a SGV vh is supported by an h-seller who always announces
a message B after s = b, but announces G and B with probability θ ∈ (0, 1) and 1 − θ,
respectively, after s = g. Then, the price remains at pG after m = G while it is pθB ∈ (pB, h)
after m = B.
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As exerting h and reporting B is optimal for the seller, her value is
vh = (1− δ)(pθB − c) + δ(hxBg + (1− h)xBb)(vh − v) + δv
=⇒ vh = (1− δ)(p
θ
B − `− c)
1− δ(hxBg + (1− h)xBb) + v
so that, in particular, we need pθB > ` for vh > v. As an `-seller could always report B,
optimality of exerting h requires
δ(h− `)(xBg − xBb)(vh − v) ≥ (1− δ)c
subject to which vh is maximized at xBg = 1 and xBb that binds the inequality.
Notice from (ICh), however, that this is the condition for (e1, ρg, ρb) to constitute a
self-generated value without communication where e1 satisfies p
θ
B = e1(h − `) + ` and
(ρg, ρb) = (xBg, xBb). As shown in Section 2, therefore, vh ≤ v∗ if c < c∗ and vh = v if
c ∈ [c∗, h− `).
Possibility 3: The remaining possibility is that an h-seller sends G and a third message
m after s = g, and B and m after s = b for a SGV. Then, pB < pm < pG and we must
have
(1− δ)pB + δ[pibvBg + (1− pib)vBb] = (1− δ)pm + δ[pibvmg + (1− pib)vmb]
≥ (1− δ)pG + δ[pibvGg + (1− pib)vGb]
and (1− δ)pG + δ[pigvGg + (1− pig)vGb] = (1− δ)pm + δ[pigvmg + (1− pig)vmb]
≤ (1− δ)pB + δ[pigvBg + (1− pig)vBb].
Therefore, if both G and B are sent with positive probability, the same value is generated
by h-seller who sends G and B with certainty after s = g and s = b, respectively, i.e.,
through a faithful strategy, with the same continuation values. Note that the seller cannot
benefit by exerting ` instead of h with message m removed, because the expected payoffs
from sending G and B remain the same for `-seller. If both G and B are unused, on the
other hand, it amounts to babbling and SGV’s of this kind have been covered in Section
2. The case that only G or only B is unused amounts to Possibility 1 and Possibility 2
above, respectively.
STEP 3: every value in [v,max{v∗, vF}] is an equilibrium value
In STEPs 1-2 above, we have shown that max{v∗, vF} is the tight upper bound of all
SGV for large enough δ < 1. When v∗ = max{v∗, vF}, the claim has been shown already
in Proposition 1.
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Hence, consider the alternative case, i.e., vF > v
∗, implying that c < c(λ). From the
proof of Proposition 2, there exists v0 < vF such that a continuum [v0, vF ] of FSGV’s
exists for large enough δ.
Consider the following strategy: exert ` in the first t periods, followed by a continuation
value v ∈ [v0, vF ], generating a value of `(1 − δt) + δtv = `(1 − δt) + δt(v − v) + δtv =
v+δt(v−v). Given the price of ` in the first t periods followed by such a continuation value
v, it is optimal to exert ` in the first t periods. The set of values that can be generated with
t lags as such is [v+δt(v0−v), v+δt(vF −v)] . Note that v+δt+1(vF −v)−v−δt(v0−v) =
δt(δvF − v0 + v− δv) > 0 where the inequality holds if δ is large enough. Therefore, every
value in (v, v0) is a FSGV with t lags for some t if δ is large enough. Consequently, every
value in (v, vF ] is either a FSGV or a FSGV with t lags for some t if δ is large enough, all
of which constitute equilibrium values (with public randomization).
This proves Step 3, thus completing the proof of Proposition 3.
E. Proof of Proposition 4
From Proposition 2 (ii′), the most efficient equilibrium is achieved at x¯ that binds both
constraints (18) and (19). Hence, communication is beneficial if ρ¯b = (1−λ)x¯Bb+λx¯Gb > ρ∗b
at this solution. To facilitate comparison, we rearrange ρ∗b in (6) as
1− ρ∗b =
c
(h− `)2 − c(1− `)
(1− δ
δ
)
=
c
c∗ − c ×
1− δ
δ(1− `) for c < c
∗.
Similarly, we solve for x¯Bb and x¯Gb from (18) and (19) and express ρ¯b as
1− ρ¯b =
Λ(λ) + c
Λ(λ)h−1
1−` + c
∗ − c ×
1− δ
δ(1− `) for λ > λ˜ and ĉ(λ) < c < c(λ)
where
Λ(λ) := λ
(pG − pB
1− pB
)
(1− `)− h+ pB = c
∗ − c(λ)
1− h . (29)
Note that 1 − ρ¯b is an increasing function of Λ(λ) and is equal to 1 − ρ∗b when Λ(λ) = 0.
Thus, whether ρ¯b exceeds ρ
∗
b or not is independent of c in the current case. Specifically,
for λ > λ˜ and c ∈ (0, c∗) ∩ (ĉ(λ), c(λ)), we have
ρ¯b > ρ
∗
b ⇐⇒ Λ(λ) < 0 ⇐⇒ c∗ < c(λ) ⇐⇒ c(λ) < ĉ(λ) (30)
where the last equivalence follows from c(λ) − c∗ = (1 − h)(ĉ(λ) − c(λ)). It is verified
straightforwardly that c(λ) decreases in λ > λ˜ and hits c∗ at
λ = λ :=
(1− h) (3h− `)
2 (2h− 1) (h− `)
(√
1 +
4 (2h− 1) (h− `)h
(3h− `)2 (1− h) − 1
)
> λ˜.21
21If h = 12 , then λ =
1
3−2` > λ˜.
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Consequently, together with an earlier assertion that ĉ(λ) < c(λ) for λ > λ˜, we deduce
that {
λ ∈ (λ˜, λ) =⇒ (ĉ(λ), c∗) ⊂ (c(λ), c(λ)) and ρ¯b > ρ∗b on c ∈ (ĉ(λ), c∗)
λ ≥ λ =⇒ (c(λ), c(λ)) ⊂ (ĉ(λ), c∗) and ρ¯b ≤ ρ∗b on c ∈ (ĉ(λ), c(λ)).
(31)
We now combine (31) with the condition (16) for beneficial communication when (17)
holds. First, (16) implies communication is beneficial when c(λ) < c < ĉ(λ) if λ ∈ (λ˜, λ),
but is vacuous if λ ≥ λ because ĉ(λ) < c(λ) by (30). For λ < λ˜, (16) implies beneficial
communication for c ∈ (c(λ), c(λ)) ∩ (0, c∗). Finally, when c ≥ c∗, communication is
beneficial whenever a FSGV exists, i.e., c ≤ c(λ).
We deduce that vF > v
∗ for large enough δ if and only if λ < λ and min{c(λ), c∗} <
c < c¯(λ). To conclude the proof it suffices to show that
{c|min{c(λ), c∗} < c < c(λ)} = {c |c(λ) < c < c(λ)}. (32)
For λ ≤ λ˜, this follows from c∗ < c(λ)⇔ c(λ) < c∗ because
c (λ) = h− `− λ(1− h)pG − pB
1− pB < c
∗ =
(h− `)2
1− `
is equivalent to
(h− `) (1− h)
1− ` < λ(1− h)
pG − pB
1− pB ⇔
(h− `)2
1− ` < λ(1− h)
pG − pB
1− pB = c (λ) .
For λ > λ˜, we verify (32) by showing c(λ) < c∗ below. First, observe that
c′(λ) =
h(h− `)(h(1− 2λ)2 − λ2)
(1− λ)2(λ+ h− 2λh)2
is positive for λ < λ˘ and negative for λ > λ˘, hence c(λ) is single-peaked at λ˘ =
√
h
1+2
√
h
∈
(0, 1/3) with a maximum c(λ˘) = h(h−`)
(1+
√
h)2
.
From c(λ˜) = h(h− `)
√
h(1−h)(1−`)`−(1−h)`
(1−h)
√
h(1−h)(1−`)`+h2(1−`) , we have
c∗ − c(λ˜)
h− ` =
(h2 + `− 2h`)[√h(1− h)(1− `)`− (1− `)h]
(`− 1)[(1− h)√h(1− h)(1− `)`+ h2(1− `)] > 0
where the inequality follows from
√
h(1− h)(1− `)` < (1 − `)h. Hence, c(λ) < c∗ is
verified for λ > λ˜ if λ˘ ≤ λ˜.
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Finally, λ˘ > λ˜ if and only if ` < h
2
1+2(1−h)√h . Moreover,
c∗−c(λ˘)
h−` =
h−`
1−` − h(1+√h)2
is decreasing in ` and assumes a positive value of 2
√
h3/(1 +
√
h)2 at ` = h
2
1+2(1−h)√h .
Therefore, c(λ) < c∗ obtains for λ > λ˜ when λ˘ > λ˜ as well.
F. Proof of Lemma 2
Observe that
λ =
√
1 + 2Y − 1
(3− β)Y where Y =
2 (2h− 1) (1− β)
(1− h) (3− β)2 and β = `/h.
Note that λ → 1/2 as β → 1 because Y |β=1 = 0 and
√
1+2Y−1
Y
= 2√
1+2Y+1
→ 1 as Y → 0.
In addition,
∂λ
∂β
=
1
(1− β)(3− β)2
√
1 + 2Y
(3−β)
[
2
1 + 2Y −√1 + 2Y
Y
− 1− β
]
.
Note that the fraction in the bracket is positive and increasing in Y > −0.5, and that
Y > Y |h=0 = −2(1−β)(3−β)2 > −0.5 since Y increases in h. Thus, the expression in the bracket
is minimal at h = 0 for any given β, which is calculated as
2
1 + 2Y |h=0 −
√
1 + 2Y |h=0
Y |h=0 − 1− β = (3− β)
√
5− 2β + β2 − 2
1− β > 0
where the inequality follows because 5− 2β + β2 > 4. This proves that ∂λ/∂β > 0.
This proves that λ increases in `. Also, as λ decreases in h for given β and λ increases
in β which decreases in h, λ decreases in h.
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